

Parallel Signcryption with OAEP, PSS-R, and other Feistel Paddings

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Abstract

We present a new, elegant composition method for *joint* signature and encryption, also referred to as *signcryption*. The new method, which we call *Padding-based Parallel Signcryption (PbPS)*, builds an efficient signcryption scheme from any family of trapdoor permutations, such as RSA. Each user U generates a single public/secret key pair f_U/f_U^{-1} used for both sending and receiving the data. To signcrypt a message m to a recipient with key f_{rcv} , a sender with key f_{snd} efficiently transforms m into a pair $\langle w, s \rangle$, and simply sends $f_{rcv}(w) \| f_{snd}^{-1}(s)$. *PbPS* enjoys many attractive properties: simplicity, efficiency, generality, parallelism of “encrypting”/“signing”, optimal exact security, flexible and ad-hoc key management, key reuse for sending/receiving data, optimally-low message expansion, long message and associated data support, and, finally, complete compatibility with the PKCS#1 infrastructure.

The pairs $\langle w, s \rangle$ sufficient for the security of *PbPS* are called *universal two-padding schemes*. Using one round of the Feistel transform, we give a very general construction of such schemes. Interestingly, we notice that all popular padding schemes with message recovery used for plain signature or encryption, such as OAEP, OAEP+, PSS-R, and “scramble all, encrypt small” [21], naturally consist of two pieces $\langle w, s \rangle$. Quite remarkably, we show that all such pairs become special cases of our construction. As a result, we find a natural generalization of all conventional padding schemes, and show that any such padding can be used for signcryption with *PbPS*. However, none of such paddings gives optimal message bandwidth. For that purpose and of independent interest, we define a new “hybrid” between PSS-R and OAEP, which we call *Probabilistic Signature-Encryption Padding (PSEP)*. We recommend using *PbPS* with PSEP to achieve the most flexible and secure signcryption scheme up-to-date. To justify this point, we provide a detailed practical comparison of *PbPS/PSEP* with other previously-proposed signcryption candidates.

Keywords: Universal padding schemes, signcryption, joint signature and encryption, authenticated encryption, Feistel Transform, OAEP, PSS-R, extractable commitment.

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1 Introduction

SIGNCRYPTION. Until recently, the two main building-blocks of modern public-key cryptography — encryption and signature schemes — have been considered as *distinct* entities that may be *composed* in various ways to ensure message privacy and authentication. From a design and analysis standpoint, this evolution makes sense, as encryption and signatures serve fundamentally different purposes. In practice, however, there are increasingly fewer applications that do not use both primitives, whether one considers secure e-mail or the key-establishment protocols for SSL or SSH.

In the past few years, research in the symmetric key setting has introduced *authenticated encryption* [5, 19, 23] to combine both functionalities in a single primitive. Soon thereafter, a number of authenticated-encryption schemes were proposed and other related investigations followed [26, 1, 22, 32, 31, 4, 11]. These results produced a variety of practical and efficient implementations. As importantly, they established authenticated encryption as a new *cryptographic primitive* which can be used to design simpler higher-level protocols.

More recent research has extended authentication encryption to the public-key setting, which is also the setting of this paper. We refer to this notion of a “joint signature and encryption” primitive as *signcryption*, following the terminology of [38]. While several papers [38, 39, 28, 20] offered security arguments about various signcryption schemes, the first formal investigations appeared only recently [3, 2]. Both works define signcryption as a multi-user primitive which simultaneously satisfies chosen ciphertext security for privacy and existential unforgeability for authenticity.¹ In terms of constructions, Baek *et al.* [3] showed that the original “discrete log-based” proposal of Zheng [38] indeed can be proven secure in the random oracle model under the so called Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption. Zheng’s signcryption scheme is quite elegant and efficient, but has the disadvantage that all parties must agree on the same public parameters, such as the common discrete log group. Thus, for example, all users must uniformly agree on the security parameter and have some trusted party perform system initialization. Also, if one party wants to use a different security parameter or a different signcryption scheme, this party has to convince all other parties to change their public keys, or he will no longer be able to communicate with them. Finally, the security of [3] is based on a specific, non-standard assumption. In contrast, An, Dodis, and Rabin [2] formally examined generic composition methods of building signcryption from *any* secure signature and encryption scheme. In addition to the sequential compositions such as “encrypt-then-sign” (\mathcal{EtS}) and “sign-then-encrypt” (\mathcal{StE}), this work also introduced a novel construction — “commit-then-encrypt-and-sign” ($\mathcal{CtE\&S}$) — that allows encryption and authentication to be performed in parallel. All these composition paradigms are very general and give rise to a large variety of signcryption schemes. Additionally, users can easily change their public keys or their favorite signature/encryption scheme, and still be able to seamlessly communicate with other users.² However, these generic schemes suffer from poor efficiency. Indeed, they all utilize relatively-expensive encryption and signature schemes which by *themselves* must already be IND-CCA2 and sUF-CMA secure.

OUR GOAL. The main motivation of this work is to design a class of signcryption schemes satisfying the following desirable properties. (1) *Key management is simple and flexible.* In particular, each user chooses its public/secret key on its own and has freedom in the type/length of the key chosen. Also, users can easily change/create their keys “on the fly” and still be able to communicate with others users, provided that they circulate the new key. (2) *Signcryption/de-signcryption are “close” to current standards for plain signature and encryption, i.e., PKCS #1 [33].* In particular, the signcryption/de-signcryption procedure should be somewhat similar to popular efficient signature/encryption schemes, such as PSS-R [7] or OAEP [6], as few code changes would therefore be needed to support signcryption with the existing infrastructure. (3) *Related to the above, users should easily be able to use their signcryption keys for plain signature/encryption functionality.*

¹We will only use the *strongest* variants of these notions, which we will denote IND-CCA2 and sUF-CMA.

²That is, user S uses S ’s signature scheme and R ’s encryption scheme when talking to user R .

(4) *Schemes must be simple and efficient.* For example, they must be faster than using a generic composition of strong signature and encryption. (5) *Despite this, schemes should be general enough to allow many instantiations.* (6) Last, but certainly not least, *schemes should be provably secure* under well-established cryptographic assumptions.

OUR METHOD. We propose the following high-level method to achieve all of the above properties based on any family \mathcal{F} of trapdoor permutations. Each player U independently picks a trapdoor permutation $f_U \in \mathcal{F}$ (together with its trapdoor, denoted f_U^{-1}) and publishes f_U as its public key. To signcrypt a message m from user S to user R , S first preprocesses m into a pair of strings (w, s) , using what we call a *universal two-padding scheme*, whose constructions and security properties will be determined later. Then, S transmits $f_R(w) \| f_S^{-1}(s)$ to R . Upon receiving ciphertext $\psi \| \sigma$, R computes $w = f_R^{-1}(\psi)$, $s = f_S(\sigma)$, and R recovers m from w and s (possibly performing some “consistency check” before outputting m ; see later). We call this method *Padding-based Parallel Signcryption (PbPS)*.³

We believe *PbPS* naturally satisfies all of the above properties (1)-(6). For example, user U independently picks his key f_U and uses the same f_U for both sending and receiving data. Moreover, the specific two-padding schemes we construct are extremely fast and very flexible in accommodating arbitrary domains for f_S and f_R , which allows users to use different families and change their keys easily. In fact, we show that popular padding schemes like OAEP, PSS-R and many others — ordinarily used for plain signature or encryption — can be used for signcryption purposes too, when viewed as *two-paddings*! Furthermore, we provide a simple, general way to construct and verify the security of universal two-padding schemes. The resulting signcryption is provably secure in the strongest sense (in the random oracle model), assuming the mere one-wayness of the underlying trapdoor permutation. Moreover, we show that the security reduction is tight for a large class of trapdoor permutations, including all the known ones such as RSA, Rabin, and Paillier. Additionally, the schemes easily achieve *non-repudiation*, since R can extract a regular, publicly verifiable signature $w \| f_S^{-1}(s)$ of S from the ciphertext (see below). Finally, the more expensive “encrypting” and “signing” operations (using f_R and f_S^{-1}) are indeed performed *in parallel*.

To summarize, we believe that *PbPS* is a very efficient, yet general method, for building a robust, flexible, and provably-secure signcryption infrastructure.

TWO-PADDING SCHEMES: OUR RESULTS. The soundness of our suggested *PbPS* paradigm for signcryption crucially depends on the properties of *universal two-padding schemes*, a new notion we introduce. Syntactically, such schemes (probabilistically) transform a message m into a *pair* $w \| s$, from which m can be later recovered. In terms of security, we require that for any trapdoor permutation f , $f(w) \| s$ is a chosen-ciphertext-secure (IND-CCA2) encryption of m , while $w \| f^{-1}(s)$ is an existentially-unforgeable (SUF-CMA) signature of m . The *universality* property additionally requires that the above *induced* signature and encryption schemes remain secure even when used with the *same* key f .

First, we formally argue that universal two-paddings — defined *entirely* using plain signature and encryption properties — are indeed sufficient for *PbPS*. This result actually requires some work, as signcryption has to be defined in the multi-user setting to prevent “identity fraud” [2]. In particular, the naive signcryption candidate $f_R(w) \| f_S^{-1}(s)$ (informally stated earlier for simplicity) will *not* be secure, unless we ensure that w and s also non-trivially depend on the public keys of S and R . Luckily, we found several simple and efficient ways to achieve this “binding” *at minimal or no extra cost*, formally justifying our initial claim.

Second, we give a simple and very general construction of universal two-paddings in the random oracle model. Our starting point was the observation that all popular padding schemes with message recovery currently used for ordinary signature or encryption, such as OAEP [6], OAEP+ [36], PSS-R [7], and “scramble all, encrypt small” [21] (in the future denoted **SAP**) actually consist of *two* natural components w and s , which

³As stated, it applies only to relatively short messages m . However, we later efficiently extend it to support long messages.

is consistent with our two-padding syntax. Moreover, the last step of computing w and s always consists of a Feistel Transform applied to some pair d and c (this step uses the random oracle H). This led us to examine which general properties on d and c suffice to ensure that $\langle w = c, s = H(c) \oplus d \rangle$ form a universal two-padding scheme. Quite interestingly, we found that all one needs is that $\langle d, c \rangle$ form a *commitment scheme* with a special property, called *extractability* (see [10]). We formally define it later, but observe that extractable commitments are extremely easy to construct in the random oracle model, which we use anyway in the subsequent Feistel Transform. Indeed, we give a number of such simple and efficient constructions, which in turn gives many examples of provably-secure two-padding schemes. Moreover, our security reductions from the corresponding two-padding schemes to the problem inverting f are *tight* for a large class of trapdoor permutations f (defined later) which includes all currently known examples, such as RSA, Rabin, and Paillier. This makes the \mathcal{PbPS} paradigm very attractive in terms of exact security.

Even more remarkable, however, is that all the aforementioned padding schemes — OAEP, OAEP+, PSS-R, SAP— become *special cases of our general construction* when viewed as two-paddings! As a result, not only do we find a natural generalization of all conventional padding schemes, but we show that any such padding scheme defines a secure two-padding scheme which can then be used for signcryption. Of independent interest, we will also define a new “hybrid” between PSS-R and OAEP, which we call *Probabilistic Signature-Encryption Padding* (PSEP). This two-padding will allow us to achieve optimal message bandwidth for signcryption using \mathcal{PbPS} .

EXTENSIONS. We extend the basic \mathcal{PbPS} approach in two important ways. First, it can effortlessly support *associated data* [31], allowing one to “bind” a public label to a message when signcrypting it. This capability has many nice applications, including allowing us to trivially bind the message to the public keys of S and R , thus solving the aforementioned “multi-user” problem for signcryption. Second, using the recent work of Dodis and An [11], we efficiently extend our method to signcrypt arbitrarily long messages; namely, to build a full-fledged, practical signcryption scheme of arbitrary messages (that also supports associated data).

RELATION TO PREVIOUS WORK. While padding schemes are very popular in the design of ordinary encryption and signature schemes (e.g. [6, 7, 36, 15]), the most relevant previous works are those of [9, 2, 27].

COMPARING WITH [9]. Our universal two-padding schemes are similar in spirit to “universal padding” schemes defined by Coron *et al.* [9], which we refer to as universal *one-paddings*. To explain this name, such one-paddings transform m into a *single* string π such that $f(\pi)$ is a secure encryption and $f^{-1}(\pi)$ is a secure signature. Additionally, [9] requires that users can use the same trapdoor permutation f for both signing and encrypting. We now compare one- and two-paddings. Application-wise, one-paddings are conceptually used for plain signature and encryption *separately*; *i.e.*, the user can either sign or encrypt with the same key. In this setting, reusing the key for signing/decrypting is much more important than reusing the padding scheme. In fact, the latter property is really of marginal importance given the simplicity of current padding schemes.⁴ In contrast, our motivation for two-padding scheme comes from *joint* signature and encryption; *i.e.*, the user can either signcrypt or de-signcrypt, and even with a single key for both. In this setting, reusing the two-padding is much more crucial: The whole application to parallel signcryption would not even *make sense* unless the same w and s can be used for encrypting and signing *simultaneously*.

On the other hand, from a technical perspective, every non-trivial partition of a one-padding into two parts is a secure two-padding — by considering trapdoor permutations of the form $f'(w||s) = f(w)||s$ and $f''(w||s) = w||f(s)$ — while the converse is easily seen to be false. Of course, prior to this work, *no* universal one-padding schemes were known, since [9] only constructs one specific to RSA rather than *any* f . Subsequent to our work, several constructions of one-paddings were found [12, 25]. However, the construction of [25] is a special case

⁴We also remark that reusing the key without reusing the padding already followed from the prior work of Haber and Pinkas [18], who show that OAEP+ [36] and PSS-R [7] can reuse the same key.




Figure 1: High-level comparison between $CtE\&S$ and $PbPS$.

of a more general construction of [12], while the latter critically builds upon this current work. Needless to say, these one-paddings are more complicated than the two-paddings we construct, and we actually *do not need* these extra complications for our signcryption application. Finally, we remark that a very special case of our result — PSS-R is a secure two-padding — can be indirectly derived from previous work of [7, 9]: [7] can be seen to imply the signing part, while the “partial one-wayness” result of [9] is general enough to imply the encryption part. Of course, our construction is much more general, gives many more two-paddings, and the whole signcryption application was not previously considered.

COMPARING WITH [2]. The parallel “commit-then-encrypt-and-sign” ($CtE\&S$) paradigm of [2] for building signcryption first applies any commitment scheme to transform m into a pair $\langle d, c \rangle$, and then encrypts d and signs c , using a IND-CCA2-secure encryption and sUF-CMA-secure signature, respectively. Two-paddings can be viewed as allowing us to replace the above “strong” encryption and signature schemes by a mere trapdoor permutation (resp. its inverse) such as RSA (see Figure 1). In fact, our Feistel-based two-padding construction essentially says that applying one round of the Feistel Transform to a pair $\langle d, c \rangle$ sufficient for $CtE\&S$, we get a pair $\langle w = c, s = H(c) \oplus d \rangle$ sufficient for $PbPS$! Indeed, *using only trapdoor permutations* our scheme fully satisfies the standard IND-CCA2 and sUF-CMA security definitions, which $CtE\&S$ schemes cannot!

Of course, another natural question is to compare the generic composition paradigm of [2] with the $PbPS$ approach in the random oracle model. For example, we could use a padding-based IND-CCA2-secure encryption, such as OAEP+ [36], and a padding-based sUF-CMA-secure signature, such as PSS or PSS-R [7]. While this is indeed a possibility, the resulting signcryption scheme is considerably more awkward and less efficient (in all respects!) than the optimized $PbPS$ approach used with any of the simple two-padding schemes we construct. Using such schemes we essentially have to pad the message twice, which only allows us to signcrypt significantly shorter messages, and results in much poorer exact security.⁵ Padding the message twice also requires more bits for the random salts and unnecessarily complicates the implementation of the signcryption and de-signcryption operations. Perhaps more importantly, while the resulting scheme is IND-gCCA2/sUF-CMA secure, it can never be IND-CCA2/sUF-CMA secure, as Enc/Sig are probabilistic (see appendix in [2]). Thus, while $CtE\&S$ provides a generic composition paradigm, it is not well suited to implementations based on trapdoor permutations (which is the setting of this work).

Furthermore, $CtE\&S$ does not support associated data, and thus lacks support for efficient long-message signcryption. Also, in order to achieve security in the multi-user setting, a hash of the sender’s identity must be included in the encrypted portion and a hash of the recipient’s identity must be included in the signed portion. These hashes further complicate the implementation and increase the bit expansion. Lastly, while it is tempting to assume the results of [18] show that $CtE\&S$ can safely reuse keys, these results are proven in a *completely*

⁵See Appendix A for details demonstrating the significant real-world advantages of our work over $CtE\&S$ in terms of exact security.

different setting when parties want to *separately* encrypt/sign with the same keys. Therefore, we require some additional verification to show that specific instantiations of $\mathcal{CtE\&S}$, such as for OAEP+ and PSS-R, can safely reuse keys (and doing so incurs additional losses in exact security). The sequential approaches (\mathcal{StE} and \mathcal{EtS}) have similar disadvantages, while additionally losing the parallelism.

COMPARING WITH [27]. This recent work suggests to use the PSS-R padding for sequential signcryption with RSA. Namely, to transmit $RSA_R(RSA_S^{-1}(\pi))$, where π is the result of PSS-R applied to the message m , and RSA_U is the RSA key of user U . This approach has several disadvantages as compared to the \mathcal{PbPS} approach. (1) While the approach syntactically makes sense for general f , using PSS-R effectively restricts its use to RSA [9]. On the other hand, \mathcal{PbPS} works for general f with a wide variety of padding schemes. (2) The exact security of encryption is *extremely* poor, while \mathcal{PbPS} gives tight security reductions. (3) The scheme can be proven secure only in the so-called two-user setting [2], and is provably insecure in a more realistic multi-user setting for signcryption. (4) While the above problem could potentially be fixed by somehow “binding” the message with the users’ public keys, a more serious problem is that [27] use a relatively weak notion of so-called Outsider security [2] for privacy. In contrast, \mathcal{PbPS} uses a much stronger notion of Insider security [2] for both privacy and authenticity. We see no obvious way how to overcome this problem in the construction of [27]. (5) The scheme of [27] is sequential, while \mathcal{PbPS} is parallel. (6) Using a sequential composition with RSA creates syntactic problems of ensuring that the domain sizes for RSA_S and RSA_R “match up”, which requires special ad-hoc care. In particular, the suggested scheme is not flexible to support RSA keys of different sizes, while \mathcal{PbPS} has no such problem.

On a positive note, if all users in the system have RSA keys of size k , the scheme of [27] allows a user to signcrypt (very short) messages with a ciphertext of length k . On the other hand, the minimal length of the ciphertext with \mathcal{PbPS} would be $2k$. We believe that this disadvantage is minor in light of (1)-(6), especially since it is relevant only for very short messages. Moreover, using the scheme of [27], one can only signcrypt messages of length significantly less than $k/2$, while \mathcal{PbPS} with an appropriate two-padding scheme allows a user to signcrypt messages of length close to $2k$.

SUMMARY OF COMPARISONS. Table 1 summarizes the comparison between this work and the previous works mentioned above. Specific estimates for ciphertext and message lengths based on 2048-bit RSA moduli (using the existing OAEP+ and PSS-R padding schemes) are provided where appropriate. The security reductions for TBOS in [27] are indeed so poor that we were unable to determine any appropriate practical message length (even though we are using their recommended key length). A more detailed breakdown of our estimated lengths which confirms the advantages of \mathcal{PbPS} can be found in Appendix A.

To summarize, we believe that \mathcal{PbPS} instantiated with PSEP substantially outperforms *all* previously proposed signcryption schemes, both from practical and theoretical perspectives. We plan to propose it as a new standard for public-key signcryption.

2 Definitions

In this section, we start by quickly reviewing some common cryptographic definitions; Appendix B provides more formal security definitions of such schemes. Second, we introduce the notion of a two-padding. We put off the discussion of signcryption until Section 5.

2.1 Encryption, Signatures, and Trapdoor and Claw-Free Permutations

ENCRYPTION. A public-key encryption scheme consists of the algorithms (Enc-Gen, Enc, Dec). Enc-Gen(1^λ) generates the public/private key-pair (EK, DK), with a security parameter λ . Syntactically, we write the randomized encryption algorithm as $\psi \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m)$, where m is a message chosen from message space \mathcal{M}

	ZSCR [3]	TBOS [27]	<i>StE / EtS</i> [2]	<i>CtE&S</i> [2]	This Work
Standard Assumption?	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Exact Security?	poor	very poor	good	good	excellent
Insider Security?	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Multi-User Setting?	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
CCA2 security?	yes	yes	yes/no	no	yes
Strong Unforgeability?	no*	no*	no/yes	no	yes
General Construction?	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Key Flexibility?	no	no	yes	yes	yes
Key Reuse (Short Key)?	yes	no*	no	no*	yes
Avoid Special Set-up?	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
Extract Plain Sig/Enc?	no	only Sig	Sig/Enc	yes	yes
Associated Data?	no	no	no	no	yes
Compatible to PKCS#1?	no	maybe	maybe	maybe	yes
Parallel Operations?	n/a	no	no	yes	yes
Estimates for 2048-bit moduli					
Bit Expansion on Long Messages	4096 bits	varies, expect > 1350 bits	varies, expect > 700 bits	varies, expect > 2900 bits	varies, can make < 450 bits
Max message can fit inside 4096 bits	0?	0?	< 3000 bits	< 1550 bits	3650 bits
Message / Ciphertext & Key in “native” scheme	n/a	?/2048 4096	1550/2300 4096	1550/4096 4096	3650/4096 2048

Table 1: A comparison of signcryption schemes. A star * signifies that this question was not explicitly considered/addressed in the relevant work.

and ψ is the associated ciphertext. We express the behavior of the deterministic decryption algorithm as $\{m, \perp\} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{DK}}(\psi)$, where Dec outputs m or \perp if ψ is invalid. In this paper, we only consider the strongest notion of security: IND-CCA2 security. This property means that the encryption scheme provides *indistinguishability* of ciphertexts (IND) [16] under *adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks* (CCA2) [30, 14]: No probabilistic poly-time (PPT) adversary can distinguish between the ciphertexts of two chosen messages, m_0 and m_1 , given the corresponding public key EK and oracle access to Dec, with probability greater than $\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}$, where $\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}$ is negligible in λ .

SIGNATURES. A public-key signature scheme consists of the algorithms (Sig-Gen, Sig, Ver). Sig-Gen(1^λ) generates the key-pair (SK, VK), where SK is the signing key kept private, and VK is the verification key made public. We write the randomized signature algorithm as $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sig}_{\text{SK}}(m)$. As we assume that the signature scheme has message recovery, the deterministic verification algorithm can be expressed as $a \leftarrow \text{Ver}_{\text{VK}}(\sigma)$, where the answer $a \in \{\text{succeed, invalid}\}$, where invalid is again denoted by \perp . Correctness requires that $\text{Ver}(\text{Sig}(m)) \neq \perp$ for any $m \in \mathcal{M}$. We consider the strongest notion of signature security, *strong unforgeability* against a *chosen-message attack* (sUF-CMA) [17, 5]: Given VK and oracle access to Sig, no PPT adversary can forge a *new* signature σ^* with probability greater than ε_{CMA} , where ε_{CMA} is negligible in λ .

TRAPDOOR PERMUTATIONS. Informally, a family of trapdoor permutations (TDPs) is a family of permutations such that it is easy to randomly select a permutation f and some “trapdoor” associated with f . Furthermore, f is easy to compute and, given the trapdoor information, so is its inverse f^{-1} . However, without the trapdoor, f is “hard” to invert: No PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , given some $y \leftarrow f(x)$, can find x with probability greater

than ε_{TDP} , which is negligible in the security parameter λ of the generation algorithm.

CLAW-FREE PERMUTATIONS. To improve the exact security of our constructions, we will also talk about a general class of TDPs — those induced by a family of *claw-free permutation* pairs [17], following the observation made by [13]. In this context, the generation algorithm outputs (f, f^{-1}, g) , where g is another efficient permutation over the same domain as f . The task of the PPT adversary \mathcal{B} now is to find a “claw” (x, z) , *i.e.*, $f(x) = g(z)$, which it succeeds at with probability $\varepsilon_{\text{claw}}$, negligible in λ . It is trivial to see that omitting g from the generation algorithm induces a TDP family with $\varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} \leq \varepsilon_{\text{claw}}$ (\mathcal{B} calls \mathcal{A} on random $g(z)$). On the other hand, all known TDP families, such as RSA, Rabin, and Paillier, are easily seen to be induced by some claw-free permutation families with $\varepsilon_{\text{claw}} = \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}}$. Thus, a tight reduction to “claw-freeness” of such families implies a tight reduction to inverting them. See [13] for more details.

2.2 Two-Paddings

SYNTAX. A two-padding scheme consists of the poly-time algorithms PAD and DePAD. The probabilistic algorithm PAD accepts input messages $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and produces a pair of outputs, denoted as $(w, s) \leftarrow \text{PAD}(m)$. The deterministic algorithm DePAD accepts input pairs of the same form (w, s) and returns either message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ or \perp . Correctness requires that $\text{DePAD}(\text{PAD}(m)) = m$ for any $m \in \mathcal{M}$.

For syntactical convenience, we further define a pair of operations, with respect to any TDPs f and f' , as the following: $\psi \| s \leftarrow \text{PadEnc}_f(m)$ and $w \| \sigma \leftarrow \text{PadSig}_{f'}(m)$. $\text{PadEnc}_f(m)$ first computes $(w, s) \leftarrow \text{PAD}(m)$ and then outputs $\psi \| s = f(w) \| s$. Similarly, $\text{PadSig}_{f'}(m)$ computes $(w, s) \leftarrow \text{PAD}(m)$ and outputs $w \| \sigma = w \| f'^{-1}(s)$. The corresponding pair of operations $\text{PadDec}_f(\psi \| s)$ and $\text{PadVer}_{f'}(w \| \sigma)$ are defined in the natural way, both recovering the pair (w, s) and outputting $\text{DePAD}(w, s)$.

SECURITY. We call $\mathcal{PS} = (\text{PAD}, \text{DePAD})$ a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_D, q_S)$ -secure *two-padding* scheme if, for any $(T_f, \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}})$ -secure TDPs f and f' , the corresponding PadEnc_f is a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, q_D)$ -secure IND-CCA2 encryption and $\text{PadSig}_{f'}$ is a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_S)$ -secure sUF-CMA signature.

We call $\mathcal{PS} = (\text{PAD}, \text{DePAD})$ a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_D, q_S)$ -secure *universal two-padding* scheme if, for any TDP f , the corresponding PadEnc_f and PadSig_f are simultaneously $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, q_D)$ - and $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_S)$ -secure, respectively, when a user reuses the same f for both encryption and signature. Formally, the adversary has access to a PadSig_f oracle during the IND-CCA2 attack game played against PadEnc_f , and, similarly, the adversary has access to a PadDec_f oracle during the sUF-CMA attack game played against PadSig_f .

2.3 Extractable Commitments

Our constructions for two-paddings will involve a specialized commitment scheme we call an “extractable” commitment. Extractable commitments have a syntax similar to standard commitment schemes, but with the additional property that there exists an extraction algorithm which a simulator can use to extract a unique decommitment from any valid commitment with high probability. This extraction algorithm immediately follows for most commitment schemes based on the random oracle model, but requires the existence of a trapdoor for commitment schemes which do not make use of the random oracle model. Note that this differs from what is commonly referred to as a “trapdoor commitment” [8] where the goal is to construct alternative decommitments (with different openings) for a given commitment.

SYNTAX. An extractable commitment scheme \mathcal{C} consists of four algorithms (Setup, Commit, Open, Extract). The optional setup algorithm $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ outputs a public commitment key CK (possibly empty) and possibly a secret trapdoor TK used by the extraction algorithm Extract . Given a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and some random coins r , $\text{Commit}_{\text{CK}}(m; r)$ outputs a pair (c, d) where c is k_1 -bit string representing the commitment to m and d is the corresponding k_2 -bit long decommitment. As a shorthand, we will write $(c, d) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(m)$ and $c(m)$

to denote a commitment to message m . $\text{Open}_{\text{CK}}(c, d)$ outputs m if (c, d) is a valid commitment/decommitment pair for m , or \perp otherwise. Correctness requires $\text{Open}(\text{Commit}(m)) = m$ for all $m \in \mathcal{M}$.

SECURITY. We require this commitment scheme to satisfy two security properties:

HIDING. No PPT adversary can distinguish the commitment of any messages of its choice from a k_1 -bit random string: $c(m) \approx R$. Formally, for any PPT \mathcal{A} running in two stages, find and guess, in time at most t ,

$$\Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(c; \alpha, \text{guess}) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (m, \alpha) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \text{find}), \\ (c, d) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(m) \end{array} \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(R; \alpha, \text{guess}) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (m, \alpha) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \text{find}), \\ R \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^{k_1} \end{array} \right] \leq \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}$$

where $\varepsilon_{\text{hide}}$ is negligible in the security parameter λ . Note that $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ is implicitly run in both experiments if necessary, and CK is given to \mathcal{A} . This property is a slightly stronger requirement than that of an ordinary commitment scheme which only requires $c(m_0) \approx c(m_1)$.

EXTRACTABILITY. There exists a deterministic poly-time algorithm Extract which can extract the “correct” decommitment from any valid commitment, given access to all random oracle transcripts (and the trapdoor TK output by Setup if necessary). Formally, for any PPT \mathcal{A} running in time at most t ,

$$\Pr[\text{Extract}(c, \mathcal{T}) \neq d \wedge \text{Open}(c, d) \neq \perp \mid (c, d) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)] \leq \varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$$

where \mathcal{T} is either a transcript of all random oracle queries or the trapdoor information TK, and $\varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$ is negligible in λ . The Setup operation is implicit when necessary, and CK is given to \mathcal{A} . For syntactic convenience, we define Extract to output a random value in the event that the extraction algorithm fails to find a valid decommitment.

We say that a commitment scheme \mathcal{C} is a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}, \varepsilon_{\text{extract}})$ -secure extractable commitment if it satisfies the above properties. The “standard” notion of a commitment requires a binding property, instead of our extractability property. We now show that a strong form of binding follows from the extractability property.

Lemma 1 (Binding property of extractable commitments) *Given CK, it is computationally hard to produce (c, d, d') such that (c, d) and (c, d') are valid commitment pairs and $d \neq d'$. Formally, for any PPT \mathcal{A} running in time at most t (where Setup is implicit and CK is given to \mathcal{A}),*

$$\Pr[\text{Open}(c, d) \neq \perp \wedge \text{Open}(c, d') \neq \perp \wedge d \neq d' \mid (c, d, d') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)] \stackrel{\text{def}}{\leq} \varepsilon_{\text{bind}} \leq 2\varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$$

When appropriate, we directly use $\varepsilon_{\text{bind}}$ for conceptual clarity and because $\varepsilon_{\text{bind}}$ may in fact be tighter than $2\varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$. Note this is slightly stronger than the normal binding property of commitment schemes, where (c, d') must not represent a valid commitment for a *different* message: We also disallow alternative decommitments of the same message.

Proof: Consider a reduction \mathcal{B} against the extractability property of the commitment scheme as follows. \mathcal{B} runs \mathcal{A} and obtains (c, d, d') if \mathcal{A} succeeds. \mathcal{B} then randomly outputs (c, d) or (c, d') with equal probability. Since $\text{Extract}(c, \mathcal{T})$ is a deterministic value, it matches the output of \mathcal{B} with probability at most $1/2$. In the event that it does not match, \mathcal{B} has broken the extractability property. Since this must happen with probability at most $\varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$, we find that \mathcal{A} succeeds with probability at most $2\varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$. \square

We now state an additional useful property of $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}, \varepsilon_{\text{extract}})$ -secure extractable commitments:

Lemma 2 \forall PPT \mathcal{A} running in time t ,

$$\Pr[\text{Open}(c, d) \neq \perp \mid c \leftarrow A(1^k); d \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^{k_2}] \stackrel{\text{def}}{\leq} \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} \leq \varepsilon_{\text{extract}} + 2^{-k_2}$$

We will use $\varepsilon_{\text{rand}}$ for conceptual clarity and because $\varepsilon_{\text{rand}}$ may in fact be tighter than $\varepsilon_{\text{extract}} + 2^{-k_2}$.

Proof: Consider a reduction \mathcal{B} against the extractability property of the commitment scheme as follows. \mathcal{B} runs \mathcal{A} and obtains $c \leftarrow A(1^k)$, chooses a d uniformly at random, and returns (c, d) . The probability that \mathcal{B} succeeds is at least the probability that \mathcal{A} succeeds minus the probability that $d = \text{Extract}(c, \mathcal{T})$. Since d is chosen randomly, the probability that $d = \text{Extract}(c, \mathcal{T})$ is 2^{-k_2} . The lemma follows. \square

3 Feistel Two-Padding

We now provide a generic construction for a class of provably secure two-padding schemes in the random oracle model based on a single round of the Feistel Transform.

Definition 1 (Feistel Two-Padding) Let $\mathcal{C} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open}, \text{Extract})$ be any $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}, \varepsilon_{\text{extract}})$ -secure extractable commitment scheme and $H : \{0, 1\}^{k_1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_2}$ be a random oracle. A Feistel Two-Padding $\text{PAD}_{\mathcal{C}}(m) \rightarrow (w, s)$ induced by \mathcal{C} is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} (c, d) &\leftarrow \text{Commit}(m) \\ w &\leftarrow c \\ s &\leftarrow H(w) \oplus d \end{aligned}$$

Note that (w, s) represents a Feistel Transform on input (d, c) using H . The corresponding $\text{DePAD}_{\mathcal{C}}$ algorithm computes $d = H(w) \oplus s$ and $c = w$, then returns $\text{Open}(c, d)$.

Theorem 1 Feistel two-padding is a universal two-padding. In terms of exact security: For any $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}, \varepsilon_{\text{extract}})$ -secure extractable commitment \mathcal{C} and any $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}})$ -secure TDP f , the Feistel two-padding scheme induced by \mathcal{C} and f is a $(t', \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_D, q_S, q_H)$ -secure universal two-padding scheme, with

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} &\leq \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} + q_S \cdot ((q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) + q_D \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} + 2\varepsilon_{\text{hide}} + \varepsilon_{\text{bind}} \\ \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} &\leq q_H \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} + q_S \cdot ((q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) + (q_D + 1) \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} + \varepsilon_{\text{bind}} + \varepsilon_{\text{extract}} \\ t' &= t - O((q_H + q_S) \cdot (T_f + T_{\text{extract}})) \end{aligned}$$

where q_H is the number of queries to H , T_f is the running time of f , and T_{extract} is the running time of Extract .

Furthermore, if f is induced by a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{claw}})$ -secure family claw-free permutations, then the signature reduction becomes tight:

$$\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} \leq \varepsilon_{\text{claw}} + q_S \cdot ((q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) + (q_D + 1) \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} + \varepsilon_{\text{bind}} + \varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$$

The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix C. We note that by the result of [13], a security loss of $\Omega(q_H)$ for our signature reduction with general TDPs is inevitable. Thus, the restriction to claw-free permutations is necessary to obtain a tight security reduction.

4 PSS-R, OAEP, OAEP+, SAP and other Feistel 2-Paddings

We now demonstrate that our Feistel two-padding construction generalizes nearly all common padding schemes currently used for plain encryption or signature. First, we observe that conventional padding schemes such as OAEP [6], OAEP+ [36], PSS-R [7], and SAP [21] naturally consist of *two* parts $w||s$ and indeed utilize a round of the Feistel Transform on various pairs of $\langle d, c \rangle$ at their last step: $\langle w = c, s = H(w) \oplus d \rangle$. Thus, using

Lemma 3 *The commitment scheme $\langle d = m_2 \| r, c = (m_1 \oplus G(r)) \| G'(m_2 \| r) \rangle$ defining PSEP satisfies:*

$$\varepsilon_{\text{hide}} \leq (q_G + q_{G'}) \cdot 2^{-(k_2 + a - n)}; \quad \varepsilon_{\text{extract}} \leq (q_{G'}^2 + 1) \cdot 2^{-(k_1 - a)}; \quad \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} \leq 2^{-(k_1 - a)}$$

where q_G and $q_{G'}$ are the number of oracle queries to G and G' made by the adversary.

By playing with the parameter a , we now have greater flexibility in choosing the lengths of w and s , or maximizing the length n of our message m when $|w| = k_1$ and $|s| = k_2$ are fixed. For example, consider the natural “balanced case” $k_1 = k_2 = k$. With both OAEP and PSS-R, we had to set $n < k$, while the total length $2k$ of our two-padding potentially allowed to make $n \approx 2k$. With the more general scheme, we can easily achieve this goal! Indeed, Lemma 3 implies that it is safe to set $|m_1| = k - 2\hat{k}$, $|m_2| = k - \hat{k}$, $|r| = |G'(\cdot)| = \hat{k}$, where \hat{k} is large enough to be a security parameter (*i.e.*, 150 bits is enough in practice). For example, using our highly conservative analysis in Appendix A with $k = 2048$, we can fit a 3680-bit message inside our two-padding (of total length 4096), instead of about 1500-1650 bits allowed by OAEP+ and PSS-R. (Of course, for many applications, signcrypting short messages is sufficient. For example, Dodis and An [11] recently showed that one can easily build an arbitrary-length signcryption from one supporting only about 300-bit messages.)

- **OAEP+.** This padding is a similar but slightly more “conservative” form of OAEP, with $d = r$ and $c = (m \oplus G(r)) \| G'(m \| r)$. The proof that above $\langle c, d \rangle$ form an extractable commitment a simple variation of the argument for OAEP, and is included in Appendix E. We remark, however, that the “extra” input m to G' used in OAEP+ is not actually necessary for our application (although it does provide a slightly tighter bound for $\varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$). The original reason for which Shoup [36] proposed OAEP+ in place of OAEP was to provide security for encryption when a generic TDP f is applied to *both* $w \| s$, instead of only to w . In fact, Fujisaki *et al.* [15] already showed that it is safe to use plain OAEP when f is only applied to w . Our much more general framework gives yet another verification of this fact.
- **SAP.** This padding scheme can be viewed as the following. Write $m = m_1 \| m_2$, and set

$$\begin{aligned} w &\leftarrow G(m_1 \| r \| G'(m_2)) \oplus m_2 && // \text{ pad } m_2 \text{ with 0's if } |m_2| < |G(\cdot)| \\ s &\leftarrow H(w) \oplus (m_1 \| r \| G'(m_2)) \end{aligned}$$

Actually, this is a slight simplification of the “scramble all” padding scheme used in [21]. In the original version, $G'(\cdot)$ was more conservatively applied to $m_1 \| m_2 \| r$. We show that for our purposes, even the simpler version suffices, which we also show in Appendix E. (Of course, the original version can be easily shown secure as well.) Interestingly, if we set $|m_2| = |G'(\cdot)| = 0$ for SAP, we again get PSS-R! On the other hand, if we set $|m_1| = 0$, we get yet another, new extractable commitment scheme: $\langle d = r \| G'(m), c = G(d) \oplus m \rangle$.

In short, the approach of Theorem 1 allows us to derive both old and new provably-secure two-padding constructions, by only showing a few straightforward properties in $\langle d, c \rangle$!

5 Two-Padding as a Secure Signcryption

As observed by [3, 2], full-fledged signcryption must be defined in the *multi-party* setting, where issues with users’ identities are addressed. In contrast, authenticated encryption in the symmetric setting only needs to consider a much simpler *two-party* setting. A similar two-party model could be used for signcryption too [2]. However, as transforming two-user signcryption to the multi-user setting is quite subtle in general (see [2]), we will right away consider the more challenging and generally required multi-user setting.

5.1 Definition of Signcryption

SYNTAX. A signcryption scheme consists of the algorithms $(\text{Gen}, \text{SigEnc}, \text{VerDec})$. In the multi-party setting, the $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ algorithm for user U generates the key-pair $(\text{SDK}_U, \text{VEK}_U)$, where λ is the security parameter, SDK_U is the signing/decryption key that is kept private, and VEK_U is the verification/encryption key made public. Without loss of generality, we assume that VEK_U is determined from SDK_U .

The randomized signcryption algorithm SigEnc for user U implicitly takes as input the user's secret key SDK_U , and explicitly takes as input the message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and the identity of the recipient, in order to compute and output the signcryption Π . For simplicity, we consider this identity ID to be a public key VEK , although ID could be of more complex form, provided that other users can easily obtain VEK from ID . Thus, we write $\text{SigEnc}_{\text{SDK}_U}(m, \text{ID}_R)$ as $\text{SigEnc}_{\text{SDK}_U}(m, \text{VEK}_R)$, or simply $\text{SigEnc}_U(m, \text{VEK}_R)$.

Similarly, user U 's deterministic de-signcryption algorithm VerDec implicitly takes the user's private SDK_U , and explicitly takes as input the signcryption Π and the senders' identity. Again, we assume $\text{ID}_S = \text{VEK}_S$, and write $\text{VerDec}_{\text{SDK}_U}(\Pi, \text{VEK}_S)$, or simply $\text{VerDec}_U(\Pi, \text{VEK}_S)$. The algorithm outputs some message \tilde{m} , or \perp if the signcryption does not verify or decrypt successfully. Correctness ensures that for any users S and R , $\text{VerDec}_R(\text{SigEnc}_S(m, \text{VEK}_R), \text{VEK}_S) = m$, for any $m \in \mathcal{M}$.

SECURITY. Below we will use the strongest notion of *Insider* security for multi-user signcryption [2]. Clearly, a weaker notion of the so called *Outsider* security easily follows as well.

As expected, the security for signcryption consists on **IND-CCA2** and **sUF-CMA** components when attacking some user U . Both games with the adversary, however, share the following common component. After $(\text{SDK}_U, \text{VEK}_U) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ is run and \mathcal{A} gets VEK_U , \mathcal{A} can make up to q_{SE} adaptive signcryption queries $\text{SigEnc}_U(m, \text{VEK}_R)$ for *arbitrary* VEK_R , as well as up to q_{VD} de-signcryption queries $\text{VerDec}_U(\Pi, \text{VEK}_S)$, again for arbitrary VEK_S .

The **IND-CCA2** security of signcryption requires that no **PPT** adversary \mathcal{A} can find some pair m_0, m_1 for which he can distinguish $\text{SigEnc}_S(m_0, \text{VEK}_U)$ from $\text{SigEnc}_S(m_1, \text{VEK}_U)$. Notice, to make *sense* of the statement, \mathcal{A} has to output the *secret key* SDK_S of the sender whose messages to U he can “understand”. While seemingly restrictive, this is a *much stronger* guarantee than if \mathcal{A} tried to do it with some sender S whose key he *did not know*. A good way to interpret this requirement is to say that even when *compromising* S , \mathcal{A} still cannot “understand” messages S sent to U . In fact, we allow \mathcal{A} much more, as he can *come up* with the secret key SDK_S without necessarily generating it via Gen ! Formally, for any **PPT** \mathcal{A} running in time t ,

$$\Pr \left[b = \tilde{b} \mid \begin{array}{l} (m_0, m_1, \text{SDK}_S, \alpha) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{SigEnc}_U(\cdot, \cdot), \text{VerDec}_U(\cdot, \cdot)}(\text{VEK}_U, \text{find}), b \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}, \\ \Pi \leftarrow \text{SigEnc}_S(m_b, \text{VEK}_U), \tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{SigEnc}_U(\cdot, \cdot), \text{VerDec}_U(\cdot, \cdot)}(\Pi; \alpha, \text{guess}) \end{array} \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon_{\text{SC-CCA2}}$$

where $\varepsilon_{\text{SC-CCA2}}$ is negligible in the security parameter λ , and $(\text{SDK}_U, \text{VEK}_U) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ is implicitly called at the beginning. In the guess stage, \mathcal{A} only has the natural restriction of not querying VerDec_U with (Π, VEK_S) , but can still use $(\Pi, \text{VEK}_{S'})$ for $\text{VEK}_{S'} \neq \text{VEK}_S$.

For **sUF-CMA** security, no **PPT** \mathcal{A} can forge a “valid” signcryption Π (of some message m) from U to *any* user R , provided that Π was not previously returned from a query to SigEnc_U . Again, to make sense of the word “valid”, \mathcal{A} has to come up with the presumed secret key SDK_R as part of his forgery. Again, this seemingly restrictive condition makes the definition actually *stronger*, similar to the **IND-CCA2** case. Formally, for any **PPT** \mathcal{A} running in time t ,

$$\Pr \left[\text{VerDec}_R(\Pi, \text{VEK}_U) = m \wedge m \neq \perp \mid (\Pi, \text{SDK}_R) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{SigEnc}_U(\cdot, \cdot), \text{VerDec}_U(\cdot, \cdot)}(\text{VEK}_U) \right] \leq \varepsilon_{\text{SC-CMA}}$$

where $\varepsilon_{\text{SC-CMA}}$ is negligible in the security parameter λ , $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ is implicit, and \mathcal{A} did not obtain Π in response to any $\text{SigEnc}_U(m, \text{VEK}_R)$ query. We call any scheme satisfying these properties a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{SC-CCA2}}, \varepsilon_{\text{SC-CMA}}, q_{\text{VD}}, q_{\text{SE}})$ -secure signcryption scheme.

5.2 \mathcal{PbPS} Gives Secure Signcryption

Now, we can formally argue that universal two-padding schemes, when used in the \mathcal{PbPS} paradigm, are sufficient for secure signcryption. Recall, in our setting each user U generates a trapdoor permutation $f_U = \text{VEK}_U$, of which only U knows the trapdoor $f_U^{-1} = \text{SDK}_U$.

To signcrypt a message from S to R , one is first tempted to generate the two-padding $(w, s) \leftarrow \text{PAD}(m)$, and then compute the signcryption $\psi \parallel \sigma \leftarrow f_R(w) \parallel f_S^{-1}(s)$. De-signcryption is done in reverse, by first recovering $w = f_R^{-1}(\psi)$, $s = f_S(\sigma)$, and finally $m = \text{DePAD}(w, s)$. We let *Basic- \mathcal{PbPS}* (Basic Padding-based Signcryption Scheme) denote this natural signcryption scheme. In fact, *Basic- \mathcal{PbPS}* is secure in the simplistic “two-party” model [2]. Unfortunately, it is trivially insecure according to our definition of multi-party signcryption. For example, an adversary \mathcal{A} can ask some honest S to send a message m to \mathcal{A} . Upon receiving $\psi \parallel \sigma$ from S , \mathcal{A} can recover $w = f_{\mathcal{A}}^{-1}(\psi)$, and then forge a valid signcryption $f_R(w) \parallel \sigma$ of m from S to any other user R . Similar “identity fraud” allows \mathcal{A} to break the IND-CCA2 security as well.

As this demonstrates, in the multi-user setting, the signcryption must non-trivially depend on the identities of the message’s sender and its intended recipient, in order to protect both the authenticity of S ’s messages and the privacy of R ’s messages. In this section, we provide one simple way to accomplish this; an optimized version is presented in Section 6 when we introduce the notion of associated data. We let \mathcal{PbPS} be the following scheme, where h is a collision-resistant hash function (CRHF) with running time T_h . The sender S simply applies *Basic- \mathcal{PbPS}* to the message $m' = m \parallel h(\text{VEK}_S, \text{VEK}_R)$. On the receiver’s side, R first recovers $m' = m \parallel \tilde{h}$ just like in *Basic- \mathcal{PbPS}* , but outputs m only if $\tilde{h} = h(\text{VEK}_S, \text{VEK}_R)$; otherwise, R outputs \perp .

Theorem 2 \mathcal{PbPS} is a $\left(t - O((q_D + q_S) \cdot (T_f + T_h)), (\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} + q_h^2 \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{CRHF}}), (\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} + q_h^2 \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{CRHF}}), q_D, q_S, q_H \right)$ -secure signcryption, provided h is a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CRHF}})$ -secure CRHF and $(\text{PAD}, \text{DePAD})$ is any $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_D, q_S)$ -secure universal two-padding scheme.

We include the proof of this theorem in Appendix F. As an immediate corollary, however, we get that any Feistel two-padding schemes, such as PSEP, PSS-R, OAEP, OAEP+, SAP, *etc.*, can be used in \mathcal{PbPS} .

6 Signcryption for Long Messages (with Associated Data)

The signcryption scheme described in Section 5 is adequate for short messages or keys; however, we can construct a signcryption scheme for long messages virtually “for free”, using an approach similar to the one described in [11]. We first extend our Feistel Two-Padding to support labels, or “associated data” as in [31]. Then, to handle long messages, we apply the previous signcryption scheme to a short one-time key used to encrypt the long message. The ciphertext of the long message is simply attached to the signcryption in the form of a label. This provides the required authenticity guarantee.

6.1 Two-Paddings with Associated Data

SYNTAX. The syntax is similar to the previously-described two-padding scheme, with the addition of a new “label” parameter \mathcal{L} provided to both PAD and DePAD. That is, we now write $(w, s) \leftarrow \text{PAD}^{\mathcal{L}}(m)$ and $m \leftarrow \text{DePAD}^{\mathcal{L}}(w, s)$. PadEnc and PadSig are similarly enhanced as follows: $\mathcal{L} \parallel \psi \parallel s \leftarrow \text{PadEnc}_f^{\mathcal{L}}(m)$ and $\mathcal{L} \parallel w \parallel \sigma \leftarrow \text{PadSig}_f^{\mathcal{L}}(m)$. Note that ψ and σ are defined exactly as before, *i.e.*, $f(w)$ and $f^{-1}(s)$, respectively. Naturally, PadDec and PadVer now expect \mathcal{L} at the front of their input string as well.

SECURITY. We call $\mathcal{LPS} = (\text{PAD}, \text{DePAD})$ a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_D, q_S)$ -secure *labelled two-padding* scheme if, for any TDPs f and f' , the corresponding $\text{PadEnc}_f^{\mathcal{L}}$ is a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, q_D)$ -secure IND-CCA2 encryption on the

message input m (considering the entire output $\mathcal{L} \parallel \psi \parallel s$ as a ciphertext) and $\text{PadSig}_{f'}^{\mathcal{L}}$ is a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_S)$ -secure sUF-CMA signature on (\mathcal{L}, m) . Note that \mathcal{A} must choose a fixed label \mathcal{L}^* , in addition to m_0 and m_1 , during the first stage of the IND-CCA2 game. Although the IND-CCA2 security does not require hiding for \mathcal{L} —in fact, it is given in the clear— \mathcal{L} is considered part of the ciphertext. For example, given a challenge ciphertext $\mathcal{L}^* \parallel \psi^* \parallel s^*$ during the IND-CCA2 game, the adversary may ask the decryption oracle to decrypt $\mathcal{L}' \parallel \psi^* \parallel s^*$ for any $\mathcal{L}' \neq \mathcal{L}^*$.

We call $\mathcal{LPS} = (\text{PAD}, \text{DePAD})$ a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_D, q_S)$ -secure *labelled universal two-padding* scheme if it is a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_D, q_S)$ -secure labelled two-padding even when a user is reusing the same TDP f for both encryption and signature. This definition is analogous to that of Section 2.2.

Definition 2 (Labelled Feistel Two-Padding) Let $\mathcal{C} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open}, \text{Extract})$ be any extractable commitment scheme and $H : \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^{k_1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_2}$ be a random oracle. A Labelled Feistel Two-Padding $\text{PAD}^{\mathcal{L}}(m) \rightarrow (w, s)$ is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} (c, d) &\leftarrow \text{Commit}(m) \\ w &\leftarrow c \\ s &\leftarrow H(\mathcal{L}, w) \oplus d \end{aligned}$$

Note that (w, s) represents a Feistel Transform on input $\langle d, c \rangle$ using $H(\mathcal{L}, \cdot)$. The corresponding DePAD computes $d = H(\mathcal{L}, w) \oplus s$ and $c = w$, then returns $\text{Open}(c, d)$.

Theorem 3 The Labelled Feistel Two-Padding described above is a secure labelled universal two-padding scheme, with the same exact security as the Feistel Two-Padding in Theorem 1, including the tighter exact security when a claw-free permutation family is used instead of a TDP.

The proof of this theorem is in Appendix D. Intuitively, the label \mathcal{L} selects a random oracle $H(\mathcal{L}, \cdot)$ from an infinite family of oracles to be applied in the Feistel transform. Using an incorrect oracle will cause d to become randomly defined; by Lemma 2, this will cause Open to return invalid. Thus, the label is effectively bound to the rest of the padding. Notice that security for the label is “free” as a consequence of our use of a random oracle in the padding: (1) there is *no* loss in security due to the inclusion of the label, and (2) the computational cost of adding the label is negligible in practice, as it entails merely increasing the size of input to H .

6.2 Signcryption with Associated Data

SYNTAX. The syntax of the labelled signcryption and de-signcryption algorithms differs from normal signcryption only by the inclusion of a “label” parameter ℓ . These algorithms are denoted SigEnc^{ℓ} and VerDec^{ℓ} .

SECURITY. The security notions for these labelled algorithms are similar to those of standard signcryption, with the added requirement that ℓ is considered part of the ciphertext (for the purposes of CCA2 decryption oracle queries), and must be authenticated. However, there is no hiding requirement for ℓ .

If we replace the universal two-padding in the \mathcal{PbPS} construction described in Section 5 with a labelled universal two-padding, the resulting signcryption SigEnc^{ℓ} supports associated data by simply setting $\mathcal{L} = \ell$. This is a natural extension, and the proof is similar to that of Theorem 2. However, we can do better than this by taking advantage of the associated data to bind the identities of the participants, rather than wasting part of the message space to append a hash of their public keys. We define *Labelled Padding-based Parallel Signcryption* ($\ell\text{-PbPS}$) to be *Basic-PbPS* using a labelled universal two-padding with label $\mathcal{L} = \ell \parallel \text{VEK}_S \parallel \text{VEK}_R$, where ℓ is the associated data to be used for signcryption and $\text{VEK}_S, \text{VEK}_R$ are the public keys of the sender and recipient, respectively.

Theorem 4 ℓ -PbPS as described above is a $(t - O((q_D + q_S) \cdot T_f), \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_D, q_S, q_H)$ -secure signcryption, provided that (PAD, DePAD) is a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_D, q_S)$ -secure labelled universal two-padding scheme.

The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2 but it provides improved exact security since the CRHF is not involved. Note that including the public keys in the associated data does not increase the length of a ciphertext since the keys are already available.

6.3 Signcryption of Long Messages using Associated Data

Using the “concealment” approach described in [11], we can extend any short-message signcryption scheme with support for associated data to include support for long messages. Although arbitrary concealment schemes will suffice, for efficiency purposes we will consider concealments utilizing any one-time $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{OTE}})$ -secure encryption scheme (E, D) ,⁶ as discussed below. As will be obvious from our implementation below, the construction described in the following theorem is analogous to that of symmetric key authenticated encryption with support for associated data given in [11].

Let $\mathcal{SC} = (\text{Gen}, \text{SigEnc}, \text{VerDec})$ be any signcryption scheme on \hat{n} -bit messages with support for associated data, and (E, D) be any one-time encryption scheme with keysize \hat{n} . We define a signcryption scheme $\mathcal{SC}' = (\text{Gen}, \text{SigEnc}', \text{VerDec}')$ on long messages with support for associated data as follows. Let $\text{SigEnc}'^\ell(M) = \text{SigEnc}^L(\tau)$, where $L = \ell \| E_\tau(M)$ and τ is a random \hat{n} -bit string. Similarly, $\text{VerDec}'^\ell(\pi, \Pi) = D_\tau(\pi)$, where $\tau = \text{VerDec}^L(\Pi)$ and $L = \ell \| \pi$.

Theorem 5 If \mathcal{SC} is $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{SC-CCA2}}, \varepsilon_{\text{SC-CMA}}, q_{\text{VD}}, q_{\text{SE}})$ -secure and (E, D) is $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{OTE}})$ -secure (with encryption/decryption time T_{OTE}), then \mathcal{SC}' is $(t - O((q_{\text{VD}} + q_{\text{SE}}) \cdot T_{\text{OTE}}), \varepsilon_{\text{SC-CCA2}} + \varepsilon_{\text{OTE}}, \varepsilon_{\text{SC-CMA}}, q_{\text{VD}}, q_{\text{SE}})$ -secure.

The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix G. The result of this theorem allows us extend ℓ -PbPS to support long messages by using the padding label $\mathcal{L} = L \| \text{VEK}_S \| \text{VEK}_R = \ell \| E_\tau(M) \| \text{VEK}_S \| \text{VEK}_R$.

6.4 Putting the Pieces Together

We now construct a complete signcryption scheme with support for long messages and associated data by collecting the pieces described in Sections 6.1 through 6.3. Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of this scheme, which we name Feistel- ℓ -PbPS.

Definition 3 (Feistel- ℓ -PbPS) Let $\mathcal{C} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Commit}, \text{Open}, \text{Extract})$ be an extractable commitment scheme and (E, D) be a one-time secure encryption scheme with \hat{n} -bit keys. Let H be a random oracle, and assume that $\langle f_S, f_S^{-1} \rangle$ and $\langle f_R, f_R^{-1} \rangle$ are TDPs known to the sender S and receiver R , respectively. Also, let ℓ denote an arbitrary length label and $M \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\hat{n})}$ be a (long) message.

Define $\text{SigEnc}_S^\ell(M, \text{VEK}_R)$ as the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
\tau &\stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{\hat{n}} \\
\pi &= E_\tau(M) \\
\mathcal{L} &= \ell \| \pi \| \text{VEK}_S \| \text{VEK}_R \\
(c, d) &\leftarrow \text{Commit}(\tau) \\
w = c &; s = H(\mathcal{L}, c) \oplus d \\
\psi = f_R(w) &; \sigma = f_S^{-1}(s) \\
\text{Output } \Pi &= \ell \| \pi \| \psi \| \sigma
\end{aligned}$$

⁶I.e., no distinguisher in time t can tell $E_\tau(M_0)$ from $E_\tau(M_1)$ for any two messages (M_0, M_1) with probability greater than ε_{OTE} .

careful selection of the parameters allows over 3680 data bits to fit into the padding when using typical 2048-bit RSA moduli. For such applications it is possible to transfer almost 3600 message bits from the one-time encryption into the padding (along with τ), resulting in about 500 bits of overhead for long messages.⁷

We believe that this instantiation of Feistel ℓ - \mathcal{PbPS} is extremely practical and flexible, and provides optimal exact security. Our scheme is consistent with current PKCS#1 infrastructure, and using low-exponent RSA, the cost of a signcryption or de-signcryption operation is approximately the cost of a single modular exponentiation. Thus, our recommended scheme truly satisfies *all* the goals for a signcryption scheme.

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⁷See Appendix A for further details.

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


Figure 4: High-level comparison between $CtE\&S$ with OAEP+ and PSS-R and Feistel- ℓ - $PbPS$.

A Exact Security Comparisons

In Table 2, we present approximate asymptotic bounds for the exact security of several TDP based signcryption schemes, including ℓ - $PbPS$ instantiated with PSEP. For EtS and StE we imagine that any leftover bits that cannot be squeezed into the padding for the second operation are somehow accounted for outside of the TDPs, with no additional loss of security. In order to achieve security in the multi-user setting EtS , StE , and RSA-TBOS all require that a hash of the participant’s identities be included alongside the message (similar to our scheme in Section 5.2). We subtract a fixed overhead of 160-bits to account for this hash (which prevents “identity fraud”) from those schemes. As was noted in [2], $CtE\&S$ requires a hashes in both the encryption and signature portions, but we assume that the signature padding is already large enough to support both the commitment and the hash, allowing us to subtract only the 160-bits for the encrypted portion (which contains the message bits).

The bounds we give are accurate up to small constant factors (which may lead to an additive error of a few bits in bit-security estimates), based on the current literature. We use q_S , q_D , and q_h to denote the upper bounds on the total number of signcryption, de-signcryption, and hash oracle queries made by an adversary (respectively). We use r to represent the number of random salt bits required and κ to denote the number of bits used to provide an “integrity check” in the padding.

In Table 3 we provide the actual bit lengths required to achieve roughly 100-bit security using 2048-bit RSA (assuming that 2048-bit RSA 100-bit secure). We used $q_S = q_D = 2^{30}$ and $q_h = 2^{60}$, consistent with current literature. Polynomial time losses in the reduction were not considered in the selection of parameters. Although this is unrealistic, we note that this approach is common, and that time loss in the reduction for ℓ - $PbPS$ is significantly smaller than that of the other schemes. In particular, ℓ - $PbPS$ does not lose any factors proportional to q_h^2 as the other schemes do.⁸ In a practical sense, this means ℓ - $PbPS$ requires a weaker assumption on the security of the TDP to achieve 100-bit security than the other schemes. We cannot achieve greater than 50-bit security for RSA-TBOS with any choice of parameters, so it was omitted from this analysis. We further note that, even using much larger RSA moduli, RSA-TBOS will require more than half of the padding to be used for integrity check bits in order to avoid cubic losses in security.

⁸Using low-exponent RSA, one can reduce the factor of q_h^2 in the OAEP+ based schemes to a factor of q_h , but even for this special case, the time losses are still worse than our scheme.

Scheme	\mathcal{EtS} using OAEP+ and PSS-R
Public Key Length	$2k$
Random Salt Lengths	OAEP+: r_1 PSS-R: r_2
Integrity Check Lengths	OAEP+: κ_1 PSS-R: κ_2
Message / Ciphertext Length	$(k - \kappa_1 - r_1 - 160)/(k + \kappa_2 + r_2)$
Time loss: $t' =$	$t - O(((q_h + q_S) \cdot \kappa_2 + q_h^2) \cdot k^3 + (q_h + q_D) \cdot k)$
$\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} \leq$	$\varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} + (q_h + q_D) \cdot 2^{-\kappa_1} + q_h q_D \cdot 2^{-r_1}$
$\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} \leq$	$\varepsilon_{\text{claw}} \cdot (1 + q_S \cdot 2^{-r_2}) + (q_h + q_S)^2 \cdot 2^{-\kappa_2}$
Scheme	\mathcal{StE} using PSS-R and OAEP+
Message / Ciphertext Length	$(k - \kappa_2 - r_2 - 160)/(k + \kappa_1 + r_1)$
Remaining entries as for EtS above	
Scheme	$\mathcal{CtE\&S}$ using $H(m r)$, OAEP+, and PSS-R
Public Key Length	$2k$
Random Salt Lengths	OAEP+: r_1 PSS-R: r_2 Commitment: r_3
Integrity Check Lengths	OAEP+: κ_1 PSS-R: κ_2
Message / Ciphertext Length	$(k - \kappa_1 - r_1 - r_3 - 160)/(2k)$
Time loss: $t' =$	$t - O(((q_h + q_S) \cdot \kappa_2 + q_h^2) \cdot k^3 + (q_h + q_D) \cdot k)$
$\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} \leq$	$\varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} + (q_h + q_D) \cdot 2^{-\kappa_1} + q_h q_D \cdot 2^{-r_1} + 2^{-r_3}$
$\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} \leq$	$\varepsilon_{\text{claw}} \cdot (1 + q_S \cdot 2^{-r_2}) + (q_h + q_S)^2 \cdot 2^{-\kappa_2} + 2^{-k+\kappa_1+r_1}$
Scheme	$\mathcal{CtE\&S}$ with key reuse ($H(m r)$, OAEP+, and PSS-R)
Public Key Length	k
$\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} \leq$	$\varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} + (q_h + q_D) \cdot 2^{-\kappa_1} + q_h q_D \cdot 2^{-r_1} + 2^{-r_3} + (q_h + q_S)^2 \cdot 2^{-\kappa_2}$
$\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} \leq$	$\varepsilon_{\text{claw}} \cdot (1 + q_S \cdot 2^{-r_2}) + (q_h + q_S)^2 \cdot 2^{-\kappa_2} + 2^{-k+\kappa_1+r_1} + (q_h + q_D) \cdot 2^{-\kappa_1} + q_h q_D \cdot 2^{-r_1}$
Remaining entries as for $\mathcal{CtE\&S}$ (without key reuse) above	
Scheme	RSA-TBOS
Public Key Length	k
Random Salt Length	r
Integrity Check Length	κ Special Parameter: $\nu = \lceil (5k)/(4\kappa) \rceil$ Note: $\nu \geq 2$
Message / Ciphertext Length	$(k - \kappa - r - 160)/k$
Time loss: $t' =$	$t/\nu - (q_h + q_S)^\nu \cdot \text{poly}(k) - O((q_h + q_S) \cdot k^3)$
$\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} \leq$	$(\varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} + 2^{-k/8})^{1/\nu} + (q_h + q_S) \cdot 2^{-r} + q_D \cdot 2^{-\kappa}$
$\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} \leq$	$\varepsilon_{\text{claw}} + (q_S q_h + q_S^2) \cdot (2^{-r} + 2^{-\kappa}) + (q_S q_h + q_h^2) \cdot 2^{-\kappa}$
Scheme	ℓ-PbPS using PSEP
Public Key Length	k
Random Salt Length	r
Integrity Check Length	κ
Message / Ciphertext Length	$(2k - \kappa - r)/(2k)$
Time loss: $t' =$	$t - O((q_D + q_S + q_h) \cdot k^3)$
$\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} \leq$	$\varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} + q_S \cdot q_h \cdot 2^{-r} + (q_D + q_h^2) \cdot 2^{-\kappa} + q_S^2 \cdot 2^{-k}$
$\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} \leq$	$\varepsilon_{\text{claw}} + q_S \cdot q_h \cdot 2^{-r} + (q_D + q_h^2) \cdot 2^{-\kappa} + q_S^2 \cdot 2^{-k}$

Table 2: Exact security bounds of several k -bit TDP based signcryption schemes in the random oracle model.

	$\mathcal{E}t\mathcal{S}$ [StE]	CtE&S	CtE&S + key reuse	ℓ -PbPS / PSEP
Key Length	4096	4096	2048	2048
Random Salt Lengths	190 + 30 = 220	190 + 30 + 100 = 320	190 + 30 + 100 = 320	190
Integrity Check Lengths	160 + 220 = 380	160 + 220 = 380	160 + 220 = 380	220
Message Length	2048 – 510 [410] = 1538 [1638]	2048 – 510 = 1538	2048 – 510 = 1538	4096 – 410 = 3686
Ciphertext Length	2298 [2398]	4096	4096	4096

Table 3: Approximate parameters for several 2048-bit RSA based signcryption schemes

B Formal Security Definitions

ENCRYPTION. This paper only considers IND-CCA2 security for encryption: No probabilistic poly-time (PPT) adversary \mathcal{A} can distinguish between the ciphertexts of two chosen messages, m_0 and m_1 , given the corresponding public key EK and oracle access to Dec. Formally, for any PPT \mathcal{A} which runs in two stages, find and guess, in total time t and making at most q_D decryption oracle queries, we say that Enc is $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, q_D)$ -secure if

$$\Pr \left[b = \tilde{b} \mid \begin{array}{l} (\text{EK}, \text{DK}) \leftarrow \text{Enc-Gen}(1^\lambda), (m_0, m_1, \alpha) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Dec}(\cdot)}(\text{EK}, \text{find}), \\ b \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}, \psi \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_b), \tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Dec}(\cdot)}(\psi; \alpha, \text{guess}) \end{array} \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}$$

where $\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}$ is negligible in the security parameter λ . Naturally, \mathcal{A} cannot query Dec on input ψ in the guess stage.

SIGNATURES. The strongest notion of signature security, **SUF-CMA**, is defined as the following: For any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , running in time t and making at most q_S signature oracle queries, we say that Sig is $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_S)$ -secure if

$$\Pr \left[\text{Ver}_{\text{VK}}(\sigma^*) \neq \perp \mid (\text{SK}, \text{VK}) \leftarrow \text{Sig-Gen}(1^\lambda), \sigma^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Sig}(\cdot)}(\text{VK}) \right] \leq \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}$$

where ε_{CMA} is negligible in λ , and σ^* was not returned to \mathcal{A} by $\text{Sig}(\cdot)$.

TRAPDOOR PERMUTATIONS. A trapdoor permutation generator consists of the algorithms (TDP-Gen, Eval, Inv). TDP-Gen(1^λ) generates the pair $\langle f, f^{-1} \rangle$, such that the algorithms $\text{Eval}_f(\cdot)$ and $\text{Inv}_{f^{-1}}(\cdot)$ define permutations of $\{0, 1\}^k$ which are inverses of one another. We abuse notation and write $f(x)$ ($f^{-1}(y)$) for $\text{Eval}_f(x)$ ($\text{Inv}_{f^{-1}}(y)$).

For any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} running in time t , we say that f is a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}})$ -secure TDP if

$$\Pr \left[x = \tilde{x} \mid (f, f^{-1}) \leftarrow \text{TDP-Gen}(1^\lambda), x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k, y \leftarrow f(x), \tilde{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(f, y) \right] \leq \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}}$$

where ε_{TDP} is negligible in the security parameter λ .

CLAW-FREE PERMUTATIONS. Formally, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{B} running in time t , we say that f is a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{claw}})$ -secure claw-free permutation if

$$\Pr \left[f(x) = g(z) \mid (f, f^{-1}, g) \leftarrow \text{CFP-Gen}(1^\lambda), (x, z) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(f, g) \right] \leq \varepsilon_{\text{claw}}$$

where $\varepsilon_{\text{claw}}$ is negligible in the security parameter λ .

C Proof of Theorem 1 (Feistel Two-Padding)

The following two sub-theorems (of independent interest), which establish regular (“non-universal”) security of Feistel two-paddings, form the main building blocks of the proof.

Theorem 7 *The Feistel Two-Padding described above produces an IND-CCA2 secure PadEnc. Specifically,*

$$\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} \leq \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} + 2\varepsilon_{\text{hide}} + q_D \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} + \varepsilon_{\text{bind}}$$

Proof: Assume there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} who succeeds in the IND-CCA2 attack game with probability $1/2 + \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}$. We describe a reduction \mathcal{B} which inverts a TDP with probability nearly $\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}$.

DESCRIPTION OF THE REDUCTION. The reduction \mathcal{B} accepts a random challenge y^* and attempts to produce a pre-image $x^* = f^{-1}(y^*)$. \mathcal{B} finds the pre-image by running \mathcal{A} and simulating responses to oracle queries made by \mathcal{A} . To initialize the game, \mathcal{B} may run $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for the extractable commitment scheme, obtaining commitment key CK and possibly a trapdoor \mathcal{T} (which \mathcal{B} never uses). \mathcal{B} then runs \mathcal{A} and simulates responses to H oracle queries “honestly” by providing truly random responses. However, for each query w to the H oracle, \mathcal{B} tests to see if $f(w) = y^*$, and if so, the simulation halts and \mathcal{B} returns $x^* = w$. \mathcal{B} also simulates responses to decryption oracle queries of the form $\psi \| s$ by examining a transcript of all H oracle queries made by \mathcal{A} and comparing $f(w)$ to ψ for every query w . If w such that $f(w) = \psi$ is found, \mathcal{B} responds with $\text{DePAD}(w, s)$; otherwise, it rejects. Note, \mathcal{B} will always reject decryption oracle queries of the form $y^* \| s$, as there is never a transcript containing a query w such that $f(w) = y^*$ (since in this event the simulation halts). When \mathcal{A} requests a challenge ciphertext, \mathcal{B} randomly selects a bit b and then returns $\psi^* \| s^*$ as the challenge ciphertext corresponding to m_b , where s^* is random and $\psi^* = y^*$ is the challenge.

ANALYSIS OF THE REDUCTION. To analyze the success of \mathcal{B} , we define a sequence of games $(\mathbf{G}_0, \dots, \mathbf{G}_4)$ which we play against \mathcal{A} . Game \mathbf{G}_0 is the original “honest” IND-CCA2 game, and game \mathbf{G}_4 is the game \mathcal{B} runs against \mathcal{A} (as described above). In game \mathbf{G}_i let S_i denote the event that \mathcal{A} guessed b correctly. By our assumption,

$$\Pr[S_0] = 1/2 + \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} \tag{1}$$

Let \mathbf{G}_1 be the same as \mathbf{G}_0 , except we replace the original decryption oracle with the decryption oracle simulation performed by \mathcal{B} as described above. We will also explicitly require the decryption oracle simulation to reject any ciphertext query of the form $\psi^* \| s$, where $\psi^* \| s^*$ is the challenge ciphertext presented to \mathcal{A} and s is arbitrary. (The original simulation as run by \mathcal{B} would automatically reject these ciphertexts, but since we are simulating the rest of the game honestly, we explicitly reject queries of this form here.) Let DecBad denote the event that our decryption oracle simulator differs from the decryption oracle in \mathbf{G}_0 . We note that the simulation may fail in only two ways:

- Case 1.* The decryption oracle rejects a valid ciphertext $\psi \| s$ because $w = c = f^{-1}(\psi)$ was not queried to H . We note that if $H(w)$ was never queried, it is randomly defined, and thus $d = H(w) \oplus s$ will be random as well. However, by Lemma 2, the probability that (c, d) is a valid pair when d is random is bounded by $\varepsilon_{\text{rand}} (\leq \varepsilon_{\text{extract}} + 2^{-k_2})$. Thus, the probability this case occurs is bounded by $q_D \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}}$.
- Case 2.* The decryption oracle rejects a valid ciphertext of the form $\psi^* \| s$. This differs from the first case because $H(w^*)$ will be defined by the challenger when it computes the challenge ciphertext $\psi^* \| s^*$. However, we note that if s is valid, we have found $d \neq d^*$ such that both (c^*, d^*) and (c^*, d) represent valid pairs. One can imagine some other reduction which plays \mathbf{G}_1 against \mathcal{A} in order to find two such pairs, attacking the binding property described in Lemma 1. Thus, this event must occur with probability at most $\varepsilon_{\text{bind}} (\leq 2\varepsilon_{\text{extract}})$ across all decryption queries, or the binding property would be broken by such a reduction.

Combining the results for the previous two cases, we have that:

$$\Pr[\text{DecBad}] \leq q_D \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} + \varepsilon_{\text{bind}} \quad (2)$$

Since \mathbf{G}_1 plays identically to \mathbf{G}_0 unless DecBad occurs, we find that:

$$\Pr[S_1] + \Pr[\text{DecBad}] \geq \Pr[S_0] \quad (3)$$

Let \mathbf{G}_2 be \mathbf{G}_1 modified so that it halts in the event that \mathcal{A} queries $H(w^*)$. We denote this event as Halt_2 . In the event that \mathbf{G}_2 does not halt, it has played out identically to \mathbf{G}_1 . We have that:

$$\Pr[S_2 \mid \neg\text{Halt}_2] + \Pr[\text{Halt}_2] \geq \Pr[S_1] \quad (4)$$

Let \mathbf{G}_3 be \mathbf{G}_2 modified so that the s^* component of the original challenge ciphertext is replaced by a random string. Denote the event that \mathbf{G}_3 halts as Halt_3 . We note that \mathcal{A} can never obtain a response to a query $H(w^*)$ in either \mathbf{G}_2 or \mathbf{G}_3 . Thus, $H(w^*)$ should appear to be perfectly random to \mathcal{A} , and therefore $s^* = H(w^*) \oplus d^*$ should also appear to be perfectly random to \mathcal{A} . That is, by replacing s^* with a random string, we have only made a conceptual change to the game - the probability space remains the same as in \mathbf{G}_2 . Clearly,

$$\Pr[S_3 \mid \neg\text{Halt}_3] + \Pr[\text{Halt}_3] = \Pr[S_2 \mid \neg\text{Halt}_2] + \Pr[\text{Halt}_2] \quad (5)$$

Let \mathbf{G}_4 be \mathbf{G}_3 modified so that the ψ^* component of the original challenge ciphertext is replaced by a random string. Clearly, this implies that the value of $w^* = c^*$ which corresponds to $f^{-1}(\psi^*)$ has been replaced by a random string. Denote the event that \mathbf{G}_4 halts as Halt_4 . We note that neither \mathbf{G}_3 or \mathbf{G}_4 ever use any information regarding the value of d^* (which may be discarded, since s^* is now chosen at random), and that \mathbf{G}_4 simply replaces the actual commitment of m_b (that is, the original value of c^*) with a random string. One may imagine some reduction against the hiding property of the commitment scheme which runs \mathcal{A} in either \mathbf{G}_3 or \mathbf{G}_4 . If the probability of any observable event in \mathbf{G}_4 is different from the probability of the same event in \mathbf{G}_3 , it may be used to distinguish the actual commitment of a message (used in \mathbf{G}_3) from a random string (used in \mathbf{G}_4). Thus, the probability of any observable event in \mathbf{G}_4 must be within $\varepsilon_{\text{hide}}$ of the probability of the same event in \mathbf{G}_3 , and we find that:

$$(\Pr[S_4 \mid \neg\text{Halt}_4] + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) + (\Pr[\text{Halt}_4] + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) \geq \Pr[S_3 \mid \neg\text{Halt}_3] + \Pr[\text{Halt}_3] \quad (6)$$

If \mathbf{G}_4 does not halt, the entire simulation operates independently of the challenge bit b . In this case, \mathcal{A} 's probability of success is exactly $1/2$.

$$\Pr[S_4 \mid \neg\text{Halt}_4] = 1/2 \quad (7)$$

Combining (1)-(7), and solving for $\Pr[\text{Halt}_4]$, we find the following:

$$\Pr[\text{Halt}_4] \geq \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} - 2\varepsilon_{\text{hide}} - q_D \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} - \varepsilon_{\text{bind}} \quad (8)$$

Since \mathbf{G}_4 is exactly the game played by our reduction \mathcal{B} (where \mathcal{B} substitutes y^* as the random string for ψ^*), and Halt_4 is the event that \mathcal{B} inverts the TDP f , \mathcal{B} succeeds with the probability claimed above. Since this probability is at most ε_{TDP} , the claimed upper bound of $\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}$ follows. \square

Theorem 8 *The Feistel Two-Padding described above produces an sUF-CMA secure PadSig. Specifically,*

$$\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} \leq q_H \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} + q_S \cdot ((q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) + \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} + \varepsilon_{\text{bind}} + \varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$$

Proof: We describe a reduction \mathcal{B} which inverts a TDP f given an algorithm \mathcal{A} which outputs a forgery in the sUF-CMA game.

DESCRIPTION OF THE REDUCTION. The reduction \mathcal{B} accepts a random challenge y^* and returns a pre-image $x^* = f^{-1}(y^*)$. \mathcal{B} begins by selecting a random integer $i \in \{1, \dots, q_H\}$, and running $\text{Setup}(1^k)$ for the commitment scheme if necessary, obtaining the public CK and possibly a trapdoor \mathcal{T} which \mathcal{B} keeps private. If there is no trapdoor, \mathcal{T} will represent the current transcript of all oracle queries made thus far during the simulation. After this initialization is complete, \mathcal{B} runs \mathcal{A} and simulates responses to H oracle queries and signing oracle queries. In response to the j -th H oracle query w_j , for $j \neq i$, \mathcal{B} selects a random value for $H(w_j)$ and returns it. In response to the i -th oracle query $H(w_i)$, \mathcal{B} defines $H(w_i) = s^* \oplus \text{Extract}(w_i, \mathcal{T})$, where $s^* = y^*$ is the challenge of \mathcal{B} .

In order to respond to a signing oracle query on m , \mathcal{B} computes $(c, d) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(m)$ and sets $w = c$. If $H(w)$ was previously defined the simulation aborts; otherwise, \mathcal{B} selects a random x and defines $H(w) = f(x) \oplus d$. Since $H(w)$ was defined in this fashion, \mathcal{B} can simply return the signature $w \parallel \sigma$, where $\sigma = x = f^{-1}(s)$. (Note that H oracle queries generated by the signing oracle simulation are not counted toward q_H .) \mathcal{B} can successfully invert the TDP by returning $x^* = \sigma^*$ if \mathcal{A} returns a forgery of the form $w^* \parallel \sigma^*$ where $\sigma^* = f^{-1}(y^*)$, which corresponds to forgery derived by \mathcal{A} using the i -th oracle query.

ANALYSIS OF THE REDUCTION. The simulation in \mathcal{B} is a faithful recreation of the standard sUF-CMA game unless the signing oracle simulation fails. Let SigFail denote the event that this happens. The only possible failure occurs when the signing oracle computes a commitment $c = w$ for which $H(w)$ has already been defined. Since at most $q_S + q_H$ values of $H(w)$ are defined during a run of the simulation, if c were a truly random k_1 -bit string, this failure would occur with probability at most $(q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1}$ on any particular signing query. Thus, if it occurs with probability greater than $(q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}$ on any such query, we can break the hiding property of the commitment scheme. Since there are at most q_S signing queries, we obtain:

$$\Pr[\text{SigFail}] \leq q_S \cdot ((q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) \quad (9)$$

Let us also denote ForgeBad as the event that \mathcal{A} outputs a valid forgery $w \parallel \sigma$, such that either (1) \mathcal{A} “reused” one of the w ’s returned by the signing oracle, but with a different σ ; or (2) the above did not happen and $H(w)$ was not first queried by \mathcal{A} ; or (3) $f(\sigma) = s \neq H(w) \oplus \text{Extract}(w, \tau)$. In the first case, we can easily build a reduction breaking the binding property described in Lemma 1, so it can happen with probability at most $\varepsilon_{\text{bind}}$. In the second case, $H(w)$ remains randomly defined, which implies a random d , and Lemma 2 implies that \mathcal{A} would be successful with probability at most $\varepsilon_{\text{rand}} (\leq 2^{-k_2} + \varepsilon_{\text{extract}})$. The last case corresponds exactly to breaking the extractability property. Again, in this case we can easily build a reduction against the extractability property, so this case must occur with probability at most $\varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$. Thus, totaling these probabilities, we have:

$$\Pr[\text{ForgeBad}] \leq \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} + \varepsilon_{\text{bind}} + \varepsilon_{\text{extract}} \quad (10)$$

Now, conditioned on $(\neg \text{SigFail} \wedge \neg \text{ForgeBad})$, if \mathcal{A} successfully forges, the forgery must correspond to one of the q_H queries of the H oracle. In this case \mathcal{B} can invert the TDP provided the forgery corresponds to the i -th oracle query, since in this case we will have $s^* = H(w_i) \oplus d_i = y^*$. Since i is chosen randomly and independently of \mathcal{A} ’s operation, using Equations (9) and (10) we get the required bound:

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} \geq \Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ succeeds}] &\geq \left(\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} - \Pr[\text{SigFail}] - \Pr[\text{ForgeBad}] \right) / q_H \\ &\geq \left(\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} - q_S \cdot ((q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) - \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} - \varepsilon_{\text{bind}} - \varepsilon_{\text{extract}} \right) / q_H \end{aligned}$$

To conclude our proof of Theorem 1, we must extend the proofs of the sub-theorems by adding a PadSig oracle to the IND-CCA2 proof and a PadEnc oracle to the sUF-CMA proof. (Additionally, we also must consider the extension to claw-free permutations.) For conciseness, we omit the details of these extensions until Appendix D. In fact, Theorem 1 follows as a special case of Theorem 3 with the label \mathcal{L} replaced by the empty string. \square

D Proof of Theorem 3 (Labelled Feistel Two-Padding)

The proof is established by definition, given the following two theorems (which are of independent interest).

Theorem 9 *Labelled Feistel Two-Padding produces an $(t', \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, q_D, q_S, q_H)$ -secure IND-CCA2 encryption $\text{PadEnc}_f^{\mathcal{L}}$, in the presence of a $\text{PadSig}_f^{\mathcal{L}}$ signing oracle (using the same TDP f), where*

$$\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} \leq \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} + q_S \cdot ((q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) + 2\varepsilon_{\text{hide}} + q_D \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} + \varepsilon_{\text{bind}}$$

and $t' = t - O((q_H + q_S) \cdot (T_f + T_{\text{extract}}))$.

Proof: The proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 7, with a few minor alterations to the reduction. In particular, H oracle queries are now of the form (\mathcal{L}, w) . This does not in fact alter *any* of the probabilities in the analysis, since a change to any part of the pair (\mathcal{L}, w) will now have the same effect as a change to w in the original proof. This effectively “binds” \mathcal{L} to w through the random oracle, preventing \mathcal{A} from simply changing \mathcal{L} to obtain a related ciphertext. In particular, recall that \mathcal{A} will select some \mathcal{L}^* to become part of the challenge ciphertext corresponding to m_b . One way to view this is that \mathcal{L}^* determines the random oracle $H(\mathcal{L}^*, \cdot)$ which is of interest to \mathcal{A} , effectively removing consideration of any other label from our analysis. The only remaining alteration is the simulation of a signing oracle which must now be provided to \mathcal{A} .

The signing oracle simulation is performed as in the proof of Theorem 8, though we note that here it is not necessary to single out the i -th H oracle query and modify the response. The simulation fails under exactly the same circumstance (when SigFail occurs) with the same probability. Thus, for the purpose of analysis, we may simply introduce the signing oracle simulator along with the decryption oracle simulator in \mathbf{G}_1 , replacing Equation 3 by:

$$\Pr[S_1] + \Pr[\text{DecBad}] + \Pr[\text{SigFail}] \geq \Pr[S_0] \quad (11)$$

Substituting this new equation into the proof, and using the bound on $\Pr[\text{SigFail}]$ from our earlier analysis gives the new final result:

$$\Pr[\text{Halt}_4] \geq \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} - 2\varepsilon_{\text{hide}} - q_D \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} - \varepsilon_{\text{bind}} - q_S \cdot ((q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) \quad (12)$$

Here, \mathbf{G}_4 is the game played by our new reduction, and Halt_4 will correspond to the event that our reduction successfully inverts a TDP, giving us the claimed upper-bound. \square

Theorem 10 *The Labelled Feistel Two-Padding described above produces a $(t', \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_S, q_D, q_H)$ -secure SUF-CMA signature $\text{PadSig}_f^{\mathcal{L}}$, in the presence of a $\text{PadDec}_f^{\mathcal{L}}$ decryption oracle (using the same TDP f), where*

$$\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} \leq q_H \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} + q_S \cdot ((q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) + q_D \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} + 2^{-k_2} + 2\varepsilon_{\text{bind}} + 2\varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$$

and $t' = t - O((q_H + q_S) \cdot (T_f + T_{\text{extract}}))$.

Proof: The proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 8, with a few minor alterations to the reduction. In particular, we replace all appropriate instances of w with the pair (\mathcal{L}, w) . By a similar argument to the one we used in the proof of Theorem 9, this alteration will not affect the analysis of the reduction. Most importantly, we note that the analysis now precludes the forging of a new (\mathcal{L}, w) pair corresponding to some valid σ , by the extension of Equation 10. In fact, there is no additional loss of security to obtain this extension, as both events ForgeBad and SigFail occur with the same probability as before. Since this is ultimately responsible for providing the unforgeability property of the label, we can see that security of labels follows for “free”. Finally, we note that the reduction must now provide a decryption oracle simulation as in the proof of Theorem 9. The

decryption oracle simulation has no impact on the signing oracle simulation, but may cause our reduction to fail if the event DecBad occurs. Referring back to our previous analysis of DecBad, we note that there is no challenge ciphertext here, so Case 2 cannot occur. Let DecBad' be the event that Case 1 occurs. By our earlier analysis:

$$\Pr[\text{DecBad}'] \leq q_D \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} \quad (13)$$

Thus, the new bound we obtain, as claimed, is:

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon_{\text{TDP}} &\geq \Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ succeeds}] \\ &\geq \left(\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} - \Pr[\text{SigFail}] - \Pr[\text{DecBad}'] - \Pr[\text{ForgeBad}] \right) / q_H \\ &\geq \left(\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} - q_S \cdot ((q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) - (q_D + 1) \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} - \varepsilon_{\text{bind}} - \varepsilon_{\text{extract}} \right) / q_H \end{aligned}$$

□

TIGHTER SECURITY REDUCTION FOR CLAW-FREE PERMUTATIONS. We begin by noting that, since TDPs are special cases of claw-free permutations, the security bound previously established for IND-CCA2 security of $\text{PadEnc}_f^{\mathcal{L}}$ holds. Since this bound is already tight, we will only tighten the reduction for the sUF-CMA proof, following the observation made by [13].

Theorem 11 *If f is induced by a family of $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{claw}})$ -secure claw-free permutations, The Labelled Feistel Two-Padding described above produces a $(t', \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_S, q_D, q_H)$ -secure sUF-CMA signature $\text{PadSig}_f^{\mathcal{L}}$, in the presence of a $\text{PadDec}_f^{\mathcal{L}}$ decryption oracle, where*

$$\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} \leq \varepsilon_{\text{claw}} + q_S \cdot ((q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) + q_D \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} + 2^{-k_2} + 2\varepsilon_{\text{bind}} + 2\varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$$

and $t' = t - O((q_H + q_S) \cdot (T_f + T_{\text{extract}}))$.

Proof: We describe a reduction \mathcal{B} which, given a claw-free pair (f, g) , finds a claw given an algorithm \mathcal{A} which outputs a forgery in the sUF-CMA game.

DESCRIPTION OF THE REDUCTION. The reduction \mathcal{B} against the claw-free properties of (f, g) operates in a similar fashion to the earlier reduction in Theorem 10, but with modified signing and H oracle simulations. To respond to the j -th H oracle query $H(\mathcal{L}_j, w_j)$, \mathcal{B} chooses a random value z_j , and defines $H(\mathcal{L}_j, w_j) = g(z_j) \oplus \text{Extract}(w_j, \mathcal{T})$. To respond to a signing oracle query for message m with label \mathcal{L} , \mathcal{B} chooses a random x , computes $(w, s) \leftarrow \text{PAD}^{\mathcal{L}}(m)$, and defines $H(\mathcal{L}, w) = f(x) \oplus d$ where d is the decommitment corresponding to $c = w$ (which \mathcal{B} may simply record during the computation of w and s). \mathcal{B} then returns a signature of the form $\mathcal{L} \| w \| x$, since clearly $x = f^{-1}(H(\mathcal{L}, w) \oplus d) = f^{-1}(\sigma)$. If \mathcal{A} outputs a forgery of the form $\mathcal{L}_j \| w_j \| \sigma^*$ where (\mathcal{L}_j, w_j) correspond to the j -th oracle query, for any $j \in \{1, \dots, q_H\}$, \mathcal{B} returns $(x^* = \sigma^*, z^* = z_j)$. We note that, by construction, $f(x^*) = s_j = g(z^*)$, and \mathcal{B} has successfully output a claw.

ANALYSIS OF THE REDUCTION. The analysis proceeds in an analogous fashion to our earlier analysis in Theorem 10.

Defining events SigFail, DecBad', and ForgeBad as in the proof of Theorem 10, we find that their analysis proceeds completely identically, and we will not repeat it here. We also note that, conditioned on $(\neg \text{SigFail} \wedge \neg \text{DecBad}' \wedge \neg \text{ForgeBad})$, the reduction now *always* outputs a valid claw if \mathcal{A} produces a valid forgery. Thus,

we no longer have a multiplicative loss of $1/q_H$ in our reduction. Using Equations 9, 13, and 10, we obtain the bound:

$$\begin{aligned}
\varepsilon_{\text{claw}} &\geq \Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ succeeds}] \\
&\geq \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} - \Pr[\text{SigFail}] - \Pr[\text{DecBad}'] - \Pr[\text{ForgeBad}] \\
&\geq \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} - q_S \cdot ((q_S + q_H) \cdot 2^{-k_1} + \varepsilon_{\text{hide}}) - (q_D + 1) \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{rand}} - \varepsilon_{\text{bind}} - \varepsilon_{\text{extract}}
\end{aligned}$$

□

E Padding Schemes that Use Extractable Commitments

In Section 4, we described how PSS-R, OAEP, OAEP+, PSEP, and SAP are all comprised of a Feistel Transform on an extractable commitment, and thus are universal secure two-paddings. Here, we provide more in-depth proof sketches supported these lemmas.

PSEP (PROOF OF LEMMA 3). The pair $\langle d = m_2 \| r, c = (m_1 \oplus G(r)) \| G'(m_2 \| r) \rangle$ resulting from PSEP is a secure extractable commitment for *any* value of a . Here, we briefly argue the scheme's exact security bounds for $\varepsilon_{\text{hide}}$ and $\varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$.padding scheme. To break hiding, an adversary \mathcal{A} must differentiate c from some random value $R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$, given the fixed m . It is easy to see that this can happen only if \mathcal{A} queries $G(r)$ or $G'(m_2 \| r)$. Since r was random,

$$\varepsilon_{\text{hide}} \leq (q_G + q_{G'}) \cdot 2^{-(k_2 + a - n)}$$

To break extractability, the adversary finds some $\langle d', c \rangle$, where $d' = m'_2 \| r'$, and one of two cases occur. In the first case, $m'_2 \| r'$ was not queried to G' . In the second, the adversary finds some $d' \neq d$ that represents a birthday attack on G' , *i.e.*, finds some $G'(m'_2 \| r') = G'(m_2 \| r)$. Upper-bounding the probability of both events in the obvious way, we get the following:

$$\varepsilon_{\text{extract}} \leq 2^{-(k_1 - a)} + q_{G'}(q_{G'} - 1) \cdot 2^{-(k_1 - a + 1)} < (q_{G'}^2 + 1) \cdot 2^{-(k_1 - a)}$$

To show the bound on $\varepsilon_{\text{rand}}$, consider that (for fixed c) a random d will be valid if and only if $G'(m_2 \| r) = G'(m'_2 \| r')$ where m'_2 and r'_2 are randomly defined by d . Since G' is a random oracle, this happens with probability $2^{-|G'(\cdot)|} = 2^{-(k_1 - a)}$.

OAEP+. OAEP+ results in the pair $\langle d = r, c = (m \oplus G(r)) \| G'(m \| r) \rangle$. We can easily see the following two results. (1) Hiding is achieved as in OAEP: $G(r)$ is a perfect OTP unless r is reused and $G'(m \| r)$ also hides m for random r . (2) Extractability is achieved as, given c , we examine all queries to G' and look for the output value matching c in its final $(k_1 - n)$ bits. For any corresponding input $m \| r$, extract $d = r$. To break extractability, an adversary must either “guess” some d' without querying the random oracles, or, at the very least, perform a birthday attack on G' . In fact, the bound for $\varepsilon_{\text{extract}}$ is tighter, as the values $\langle m, r \rangle \neq \langle m', r' \rangle$ returned by the birthday attack must simultaneously satisfy the equations $G'(m \| r) = G'(m' \| r')$ and $m \oplus G(r) = m' \oplus G(r')$.

SAP. Now, we briefly argue that the corresponding pair $\langle d = m_1 \| r \| G'(m_2), c = G(d) \oplus m_2 \rangle$ forms an extractable commitment. (1) Hiding is true as before: on inputs that include a random r (such as d), $G(\cdot)$ is a perfect OTP unless r is reused. (2) Extractability is achieved as we examine all input queries $(m'_1 \| r' \| \gamma)$ to G and look for the output value which, xor'd with c , yields an m_2 for which $G'(m_2) = \gamma$. Finding an alternative decommitment by Extract requires one to find some $\langle m_1, m_2, r \rangle$ and $\langle m'_1, m'_2, r' \rangle$ such that $G(m_1 \| r \| G'(m_2)) \oplus G(m'_1 \| r' \| G'(m'_2)) = m_2 \oplus m'_2$. This, however, can be easily seen to imply that either (1) $G'(m_2) = G'(m'_2)$ for $m_2 \neq m'_2$, or (2) one has to find values $\alpha \neq \beta$ such that $G(\alpha) \oplus G(\beta)$ is equal to a fixed constant. By birthday bound, both events happen with negligible probability.

F Proof of Theorem 2 (\mathcal{PbPS})

This section proves that \mathcal{PbPS} is a secure signcryption parameterized as follows:

$$\left(t - O((q_D + q_S) \cdot (T_f + T_h)), (\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} + q_h^2 \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{CRHF}}), (\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} + q_h^2 \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{CRHF}}), q_D, q_S, q_H, q_h \right)$$

Instead of reducing \mathcal{PbPS} directly again to the underlying TDP, we make use of Theorem 1, which has already established that there exists a $(t, \varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}}, \varepsilon_{\text{CMA}}, q_D, q_S, q_H)$ -secure universal two-padding scheme \mathcal{PS} , such that PadEnc is a IND-CCA2 secure encryption and PadSig is a sUF-CMA secure signature, even when the same key pair is used for both encryption and signature.

Note that in the Insider model, the full universal two-padding $f(w) \| f^{-1}(s)$ reduces to just $f(w) \| s$ for the CCA2 game and $w \| f^{-1}(s)$ for the CMA game, or exactly PadEnc and PadSig, respectively. The inclusion of identities in signcryption adds a few definitional subtleties; otherwise, the reduction would be trivial.

Proof: Our proof of \mathcal{PbPS} uses the following reductions:

- PadEnc is IND-CCA2 secure encryption $\Rightarrow \mathcal{PbPS}$ is IND-CCA2 secure signcryption
- PadSig is sUF-CMA secure signature $\Rightarrow \mathcal{PbPS}$ is sUF-CMA secure signcryption

If these reductions hold, any such \mathcal{PS} yields a secure signcryption \mathcal{PbPS} .

PROOF OF IND-CCA2. We give a reduction \mathcal{B} which uses any adversary \mathcal{A} against the IND-CCA2 security of the \mathcal{PbPS} signcryption to break the IND-CCA2 security of PadEnc. \mathcal{B} answers both signcryption and de-signcryption queries from \mathcal{A} . The reduction is straight-forward.

\mathcal{B} handles \mathcal{A} 's signcryption queries of the form (m, VEK_R) as follows. \mathcal{B} generates $m' = m \| h(\text{VEK}_A, \text{VEK}_R)$ and sends m' to the PadSig signing oracle. The oracle returns something of the form $(w \| \sigma) \leftarrow \text{PadSig}_{\mathcal{A}}(m')$. \mathcal{B} computes $\psi \leftarrow f_R(w)$ and returns $\psi \| \sigma$ as the response to \mathcal{A} .

At some point, \mathcal{A} issues its IND-CCA2 challenge $(m_0, m_1, \text{SDK}_S, \text{VEK}_S)$. \mathcal{B} similarly generates (m'_0, m'_1) using $(\text{VEK}_S, \text{VEK}_A)$, and queries a PadEnc challenge oracle, which returns $\psi^* \| s^*$ for some m'_b . \mathcal{B} then computes $\sigma^* \leftarrow f_{\text{SDK}_S}^{-1}(s^*)$ and returns $\psi^* \| \sigma^*$ to \mathcal{A} as the challenge ciphertext.

\mathcal{B} handles \mathcal{A} 's de-signcryption queries of the form $(\psi \| \sigma, \text{VEK}_S)$ as follows. \mathcal{B} computes $s \leftarrow f_S(\sigma)$ and passes $\psi \| s$ to the PadDec decryption oracle. If the oracle returns some $m' = m \| \tilde{h}$, such that $\tilde{h} = h(\text{VEK}_S, \text{VEK}_A)$, \mathcal{B} returns m . Otherwise, \mathcal{B} returns \perp .

The re-use of keys must be considered in the case that \mathcal{A} submits a valid de-signcryption query of the form $(\psi^* \| \sigma^*, \text{VEK}_{S'})$. We know that $\text{VEK}_{S'} \neq \text{VEK}_S$, as \mathcal{A} is not allowed to query the oracle with the IND-CCA2 challenge. Therefore, \mathcal{A} must have found some $\text{VEK}_{S'}$ that breaks the hash function's collision-resistance, *i.e.*, $h(\text{VEK}_S, \text{VEK}_A) = h(\text{VEK}_{S'}, \text{VEK}_A)$, which is a legal oracle query in the multi-party Insider model.

Therefore, \mathcal{B} has clearly completely simulated the actions of the signcryption oracle. If \mathcal{B} returns the same guess \tilde{b} that \mathcal{A} returns, it has the same advantage in breaking the IND-CCA2 security of \mathcal{PbPS} as \mathcal{A} does for breaking the IND-CCA2 security of PadEnc, modulo the birthday-bounded probability of finding a collision in h . That is, \mathcal{B} 's advantage is $\varepsilon_{\text{CCA2}} + q_h^2 \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{CRHF}}$.

PROOF OF sUF-CMA. We give a reduction \mathcal{B} which uses any adversary \mathcal{A} against the sUF-CMA security of the \mathcal{PbPS} signcryption to break the sUF-CMA security of PadSig. \mathcal{B} simulates responses for \mathcal{A} 's signcryption and de-signcryption queries in the same manner as described above.

At some point, \mathcal{A} returns a forgery on m of the form $(\psi^* \| \sigma^*, \text{SDK}_R, \text{VEK}_R)$. Given this forgery, \mathcal{B} simply computes $w^* \leftarrow f_{\text{SDK}_R}^{-1}(\psi^*)$ and returns $w^* \| \sigma^*$. Remember that this forgery can be on some message m previously queried to the signcryption oracle, provided that the forgery differs in VEK_R .

\mathcal{B} 's output $w^* || \sigma^*$ is a valid forgery on m' , provided that this value has not been returned previously by the PadSig oracle. This event again occurs only with the probability that \mathcal{A} previously made the signcryption query $(m, \text{VEK}_{R'})$, and $h(\text{VEK}_{\mathcal{A}}, \text{VEK}_R) = h(\text{VEK}_{\mathcal{A}}, \text{VEK}_{R'})$, for $\text{VEK}_R \neq \text{VEK}_{R'}$. Therefore, once again, \mathcal{B} forges with the same probability as \mathcal{A} , modulo the probability of finding a collision in h . That is, \mathcal{B} 's advantage is $\varepsilon_{\text{CMA}} + q_h^2 \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{CRHF}}$. \square

G Proof of Theorem 5 (Signcryption of Long Messages)

Proof: The sUF-CMA security bound is automatic, since the notion of a forgery for signcryption with associated data encompasses the entire signciphertext, including the label. In other words, consider a reduction \mathcal{B} against the sUF-CMA security of \mathcal{SC} that uses any \mathcal{A} that breaks the sUF-CMA security of \mathcal{SC}' . \mathcal{B} simply answers \mathcal{A} 's signcryption queries $\text{SigEnc}^{\ell}(M, \text{VEK})$ by selecting at random a τ , and then returning $\text{SigEnc}^{\ell || E_{\tau}(M)}(\tau, \text{VEK})$. \mathcal{B} uses the obvious corresponding approach for VerDec' queries. Clearly, any signciphertext \mathcal{A} forges against \mathcal{SC}' is also a valid forgery against \mathcal{SC} , and thus the reduction succeeds with the same probability as \mathcal{A} by simply returning \mathcal{A} 's forgery.

The IND-CCA2 security reduction is also as described above, and the security bound follows from a simple two-step hybrid argument.

- (1) We modify the original IND-CCA2 game by replacing the E_{τ} operation during the construction of the challenge ciphertext with $E_{\tilde{\tau}}$, where $\tilde{\tau}$ is a random key independent of the signcrypted key τ . Any adversary capable of telling this game apart from the original game can be used to win the IND-CCA2 game against the underlying signcryption scheme \mathcal{SC} with at least the same advantage. It does this by simply using the label $E_{\tau}(M_b)$ (where $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$) and providing $m_0 = \tau$ and $m_1 = \tilde{\tau}$ as the messages it claims to distinguish against \mathcal{SC} in the IND-CCA2 attack (it also uses the same oracle simulations as \mathcal{B}). Thus, in this step, the advantage of \mathcal{B} is reduced by at most $\varepsilon_{\text{SC-CCA2}}$.
- (2) We replace $E_{\tilde{\tau}}(M)$ in the challenge ciphertext by $E_{\tilde{\tau}}(\tilde{M})$, where \tilde{M} is a random message. Any adversary capable of differentiating this game from the game of Step 1 can be used to break the security of the one-time encryption with at least the same advantage. (In a fashion similar to Step 1, we can use \mathcal{SC} to signcrypt a random string with either $E_{\tilde{\tau}}(M)$ or $E_{\tilde{\tau}}(\tilde{M})$ as the label and use \mathcal{A} to distinguish the resulting ciphertexts.) Thus, in going to this final step, the advantage of \mathcal{B} is further reduced by at most ε_{OTE} .

We note that, in the final step, \mathcal{B} cannot have any advantage over guessing, since the challenge ciphertext is random and independent of the challenge messages. Therefore, by this hybrid argument, \mathcal{B} has a total advantage at most $\varepsilon_{\text{SC-CCA2}} + \varepsilon_{\text{OTE}}$ in the original game, and the proof is complete. \square