

Improved Identity-Based Signcryption

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Abstract. We present an identity-based signcryption scheme that we believe is the most efficient proposed to date. We provide random oracle model [5] proofs of security under the definitions proposed in [7].

Keywords. signcryption, identity-based cryptography, pairings

1 Introduction

Two of the most important services offered by cryptography are those of providing private and authenticated communications. Much research has been done into creating encryption schemes to meet highly developed notions of privacy [5, 13]. Similarly, designing unforgeable signature schemes to give authenticity and non-repudiation is also a well studied problem [14, 20]. It is possible to combine encryption schemes and signature schemes, using methods such as those described in [1], to obtain private and authenticated communications.

In 1997 Zheng proposed a primitive that he called *signcryption* [23]. The idea of a signcryption scheme is to combine the functionality of an encryption scheme with that of a signature scheme. It must provide privacy; signcryptions must be unforgeable; and there must be a method to settle repudiation disputes. This must be done in a more efficient manner than a composition of an encryption scheme with a signature scheme. In [23] Zheng also proposed a discrete logarithm based scheme. This original paper did not formalise security notions for signcryption. The first definitions of security appeared in [1, 2]. These dealt with privacy and unforgeability. Security proofs for Zheng's original scheme were provided in [2]. A signcryption scheme based on RSA was proposed in [19]. This scheme has proofs of security under the RSA assumption in a model from [1].

The concept *identity-based cryptography* was proposed by Shamir in 1984 [22]. The idea of an identity-based system is that public keys can be derived from arbitrary strings. This means that if a user has a string corresponding to its identity, this string can be used to derive the user's public key. For this to

work there is a *trusted authority* (TA henceforth) that generates private keys using some master key related to the global parameters for the system. In [22] Shamir proposed an identity-based signature scheme but for many years identity-based encryption remained an open problem. The problem was solved nearly two decades after it was originally proposed [6, 10]. In [10] Cocks proposed a solution based on quadratic residuosity and in [6] Boneh and Franklin gave a scheme based on bilinear pairings on elliptic curves. It is pairings on elliptic curves that have subsequently become the most popular building block for identity-based schemes. Many schemes have been designed using this primitive, for example the signature schemes of [8, 15] and the authenticated encryption scheme of [16].

The idea of *identity-based signcryption* was first proposed in [18] along with a security model. The model of [18] dealt with notions of privacy and unforgeability. A weakness in the scheme from [18] was subsequently pointed out in [17] where a new scheme was proposed. The new scheme came with proofs of security in the model of [18]. This model was developed in [7]. Three new security notions were added: *ciphertext unlinkability*, *ciphertext authentication* and *ciphertext anonymity*. We will discuss these notions in detail in Section 3. A scheme was also proposed in [7] and analysed in the enhanced model.

We take the model and scheme from [7] as the starting point for this work. We will describe a modification of the scheme from [7] that is considerably more efficient. We will also prove that the new scheme is secure in the model of [7]. Our scheme is efficient since we can make use of a variant of the simple BasicIdent encryption scheme from [6]. If this encryption scheme is used alone, it is not secure against an active attack. To overcome this problem a technique proposed in [11] is used in [6]. This introduces a computational overhead. An interesting observation is that, in our signcryption scheme, the integrity checking necessary for security against adaptive adversaries comes directly from the signature.

The paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we will formally define what we mean by identity-based signcryption. Section 3 recalls the security model from [7]. We will present our scheme in Section 4 and provide security results in Section 5. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.

2 Identity-Based Signcryption

We follow the approach of [7] in defining what we mean by identity-based signcryption. An identity-based signcryption scheme consists of the following six algorithms: **Setup**, **Extract**, **Sign**, **Encrypt**, **Decrypt** and **Verify**. We describe the functions of each below.

- **Setup**: On input of a security parameter 1^k the TA uses this algorithm to produce a pair (\mathbf{params}, s) , where \mathbf{params} are the global public parameters for the system and s is the master secret key. The public parameters include a global public key Q_{TA} , a description of a finite message space \mathcal{M} , a description of a finite signature space \mathcal{S} and a description of a finite ciphertext space \mathcal{C} . We will assume that \mathbf{params} are publicly known so that we do not need to explicitly provide them as input to other algorithms.

- **Extract:** On input of an identity ID_U and the master secret key s , the TA uses this algorithm to compute a secret key S_U corresponding to ID_U .
- **Sign:** User A with identity ID_A and secret key S_A uses this algorithm with input (m, S_A) to produce a signature σ on m valid under the public key derived from ID_A . It also produces some ephemeral data r .
- **Encrypt:** On input of $(S_A, ID_B, m, \sigma, r)$, ID_A uses this algorithm to produce a ciphertext c . This is the encryption of m , and ID_A 's signature on m , which can be decrypted using the user with identity ID_B 's secret key.
- **Decrypt:** User B with identity ID_B and secret key S_B uses this algorithm with input (c, S_B) to produce (m, ID_A, σ) where m is a message and σ is a purported signature by ID_A on m .
- **Verify:** On input of (m, ID_A, σ) , this algorithm outputs \top if σ is ID_A 's signature on m and it outputs \perp otherwise.

The above algorithms have the following consistency requirement. If

$$\begin{aligned} (m, \sigma, r) &\leftarrow \mathbf{Sign}(m, S_A), \\ c &\leftarrow \mathbf{Encrypt}(S_A, ID_B, m, \sigma, r), \text{ and} \\ (\hat{m}, \hat{ID}_A, \hat{\sigma}) &\leftarrow \mathbf{Decrypt}(c, S_B), \end{aligned}$$

then we must have $\hat{ID}_A = ID_A$, $m = \hat{m}$ and

$$\top \leftarrow \mathbf{Verify}(\hat{m}, \hat{ID}_A, \hat{\sigma}).$$

Note that in some models for signcryption [23] and identity-based signcryption [18, 17], the **Sign** and **Encrypt** algorithms are treated as one “signcryption” algorithm, as are the **Decrypt** and **Verify** algorithms. Our scheme supports a separation and so we stick with the above definition as in [7]. One advantage of this approach, where it is possible, is that it makes non-repudiation a straightforward consequence of unforgeability. This is due to the fact that after decryption there is a publicly verifiable signature that can be forwarded to a third party. Signcryption schemes that do not support this separation may have problems with non-repudiation [23].

3 Security Notions

In this section we review the security model for identity-based signcryption proposed in [7]. This model uses the notions of *insider security* and *outsider security* from [1]. Informally insider security is security against a legitimate user of the scheme while outsider security is security against an outside third party. Where appropriate, this makes insider security a stronger notion. We will make further comment about the significance of the distinction at relevant points in this section.

A security definition dubbed ciphertext unlinkability is described in [7]. Informally this notion means that Alice is able to deny having sent a given ciphertext to Bob, even if the ciphertext decrypts under Bob's secret key to a message

bearing Alice’s signature. This property is demonstrated for the scheme in [7] by showing that given a message signed by Alice, Bob is able to create a valid ciphertext addressed to himself for that message. We do not treat this notion explicitly here since it is rather unmotivated, suffice it to say that the construction given in [7] is easily modified for our scheme if necessary.

3.1 Ciphertext Authentication

A scheme offering ciphertext authentication provides the guarantee to the recipient of a signed and encrypted message that the message was encrypted by the same person who signed it. This means that the ciphertext must have been encrypted throughout the the transmission and so it cannot have been the victim of a successful man-in-the-middle attack. It also implies that the signer chose the recipient for its signature.

We define this notion via a game played by a challenger and an adversary.

Game

- **Initial:** The challenger runs $\mathbf{Setup}(1^k)$ and gives the resulting \mathbf{params} to the adversary. It keeps s secret.
- **Probing:** The challenger is probed by the adversary who makes the following queries.
 - **Sign/Encrypt:** The adversary submits a sender identity, a receiver identity and a message to the challenger. The challenger responds with the signature of the sender on the message, encrypted under the public key of the receiver.
 - **Decrypt/Verify:** The adversary submits a ciphertext and a receiver identity to the challenger. The challenger decrypts the ciphertext under the secret key of the receiver. It then verifies that the resulting decryption is a valid message/signature pair under the public key of the decrypted identity. If so the challenger returns the message, its signature and the identity of the signer, otherwise it returns \perp .
 - **Extract:** The adversary submits an identity to the challenger. The challenger responds with the secret key of that identity.
- **Forge:** The adversary returns a recipient identity ID_B and a ciphertext c . Let (m, ID_A, σ) be the result of decrypting c under the secret key corresponding to ID_B . The adversary wins if $ID_A \neq ID_B$; $\mathbf{Verify}(m, ID_A, \sigma) = \top$; no extraction query was made on ID_A , or ID_B ; and c did not result from a sign/encrypt query with sender ID_A and recipient ID_B .

Definition 1. *Let A denote an adversary that plays the game above. If the quantity $\mathbf{Adv}[A] = \mathbf{Pr}[A \text{ wins}]$ is negligible we say that the scheme in question is existentially ciphertext-unforgeable against outsider chosen-message attacks, or AUTH-IBSC-CMA secure.*

Here we have an example of outsider security since the adversary is not able to extract the secret key corresponding to ID_B . This models the true adversarial scenario where an attack would be re-encrypting a signed message using a public key with unknown secret key.

3.2 Message Confidentiality

The accepted notion of security with respect to confidentiality for public key encryption is *indistinguishability of encryptions under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack*, as formalised in [21]. The notion of security defined in the game below is a natural adaptation of this notion to the identity-based signcryption setting.

Game

- **Initial:** The challenger runs $\mathbf{Setup}(1^k)$ and gives the resulting \mathbf{params} to the adversary. It keeps s secret.
- **Phase 1:** The challenger is probed by the adversary who makes queries as in the game of Section 3.1. At the end of Phase 1 the adversary outputs two identities $\{ID_A, ID_B\}$ and two messages $\{m_0, m_1\}$. The adversary must not have made an extract query on ID_B .
- **Challenge:** The challenger chooses a bit b uniformly at random. It signs m_b under the secret key corresponding to ID_A and encrypts the result under the public key of ID_B to produce c . The challenger returns c to the adversary.
- **Phase 2:** The adversary continues to probe the challenger with the same type of queries that it made in Phase 1. It is not allowed to extract the private key corresponding to ID_B and it is not allowed to make a decrypt/verify query for c under ID_B .
- **Response:** The adversary returns a bit b' . We say that the adversary *wins* if $b' = b$.

Definition 2. Let \mathcal{A} denote an adversary that plays the game above. If the quantity $\mathbf{Adv}[\mathcal{A}] = |\Pr[b' = b] - \frac{1}{2}|$ is negligible we say that the scheme in question is *semantically secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack*, or *IND-IBSC-CCA2 secure*.

Note that Definition 2 deals with insider security since the adversary is assumed to have access to the private key of the sender of a signcryptured message. This means that confidentiality is preserved even if a sender’s key is compromised. Signcryption schemes such as [3, 23] do not have this property.

3.3 Signature Non-Repudiation

A signcryption scheme offering non-repudiation prevents the sender of a signcryptured message from disavowing its signature. Note that non-repudiation is not as straightforward for signcryption as it is for digital signature schemes since we are dealing with encrypted data. As a consequence, by default, only the intended recipient of a signcryption can verify.

We define the notion of non-repudiation via the following game played by a challenger and an adversary.

Game

- **Initial:** The challenger runs $\mathbf{Setup}(1^k)$ and gives the resulting \mathbf{params} to the adversary. It keeps s secret.

- **Probing**: The challenger is probed by the adversary who makes queries as in the game of Section 3.1.
- **Forge**: The adversary returns a recipient identity ID_B and a ciphertext c . Let (m, ID_A, σ) be the result of decrypting c under the secret key corresponding to ID_B . The adversary wins if $ID_A \neq ID_B$; **Verify** $(m, ID_A, \sigma) = \top$; no extraction query was made on ID_A ; no sign/encrypt query $(m, ID_A, ID_{B'})$ was responded to with a ciphertext whose decryption under the private key of $ID_{B'}$ is (m, ID_A, σ) .

This model is a natural adaptation of existential unforgeability (EUF) under adaptive chosen message attack, the accepted notion of security for digital signature schemes [14, 20].

Definition 3. *Let A denote an adversary that plays the game above. If the quantity $\text{Adv}[A] = \Pr[A \text{ wins}]$ is negligible we say that the scheme in question is existentially unforgeable against insider chosen-message attacks, or EUF-IBSCMA secure.*

In Definition 3 we allow the adversary access to the secret key of the recipient of the forgery. It is this that gives us insider security. Also note that the adversary’s advantage is with respect to its success in forging the signature within the ciphertext. This is indeed the correct definition for non-repudiation in this context because it is the signature and not the ciphertext that contains it that is forwarded to a third party in the case of a dispute.

3.4 Ciphertext Anonymity

Ciphertext anonymity is the property that ciphertexts contain no third-party extractable information that helps to identify the sender of the ciphertext or the intended recipient. It is defined via the following game.

Game

- **Initial**: The challenger runs **Setup** (1^k) and gives the resulting **params** to the adversary. It keeps s secret.
- **Phase 1**: The challenger is probed by the adversary who makes queries as in the game of Section 3.1. At the end of Phase 1 the adversary outputs a message m ; two sender identities $\{ID_{A_0}, ID_{A_1}\}$; and two recipient identities $\{ID_{B_0}, ID_{B_1}\}$. The adversary must not have made an extract query on either of $\{ID_{B_0}, ID_{B_1}\}$.
- **Challenge**: The challenger chooses two bits (b, \hat{b}) uniformly at random. It signs m under the secret key S_{A_b} corresponding to ID_{A_b} . It then encrypts the result under the public key of $ID_{B_{\hat{b}}}$ to produce a ciphertext c . The challenger returns c to the adversary.
- **Phase 2**: The adversary continues to probe the challenger with the same type of queries that it made in Phase 1. It is not allowed to extract the private key corresponding to ID_{B_0} or ID_{B_1} and it is not allowed to make a decrypt/verify query for c under ID_{B_0} or under ID_{B_1} .

- **Response:** The adversary returns two bits (b', \hat{b}') . We say that the adversary wins if $b = \hat{b}$ or $b' = \hat{b}'$.

Definition 4. Let A denote an adversary that plays the game above. If the quantity $\text{Adv}[A] = |\Pr[b' = b \vee \hat{b}' = \hat{b}] - \frac{3}{4}|$ is negligible we say that the scheme in question is ciphertext-anonymous against insider adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack, or ANON-IBSC-CCA2 secure.

Note that in the equivalent definition from [7] the adversary only wins if $b = \hat{b}$ and $b' = \hat{b}'$. It is stated there that the scheme is ANON-IBSC-CCA2 secure if the quantity $\text{Adv}[A] = |\Pr[b' = b \wedge \hat{b}' = \hat{b}] - \frac{1}{4}|$ is negligible. The two definitions are clearly equivalent. We prefer our formulation because it explicitly states that the adversary should not be able to guess either of the bits. The intuition is that it gains no information about the sender of a message or the intended recipient. Definition 4 follows from the fact that the adversary is always able to guess at least one of the bits correctly with probability $3/4$.

4 The Scheme

In this section we describe how our identity-based signcryption scheme works. We will refer to the scheme as IBSC henceforth.

Before explaining our scheme we must briefly summarise the mathematical primitives necessary for pairing based cryptography. We require two groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 of large prime order q . These groups must be such that there exists a non-degenerate, efficiently computable map $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$. This map must be bilinear i.e. for all $P_1, P_2 \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and all $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ we have $\hat{e}(aP_1, bP_2) = \hat{e}(P_1, P_2)^{ab}$. A popular construction for such groups uses supersingular elliptic curves over finite fields. The bilinear map is realised using a modification of the Tate pairing or the Weil pairing. For details of such instantiations see [4, 6, 12].

We also require three hash functions $H_0 : \{0, 1\}^{k_1} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$, $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^{k_0+n} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $H_2 : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_0+k_1+n}$. Here k_0 is the number of bits required to represent an element of \mathbb{G}_1 ; k_1 is the number of bits required to represent an identity; and n is the number of bits of a message to be signed and encrypted.

Setup

- Establish parameters $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, q, \hat{e}, H_0 : \{0, 1\}^{k_1} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1, H_1 : \{0, 1\}^{k_0+n} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $H_2 : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_0+k_1+n}$ as described above.
- Choose P such that $\langle P \rangle = \mathbb{G}_1$ i.e. P is a generator for the cyclic group \mathbb{G}_1 .
- Choose s uniformly from \mathbb{Z}_q^* and compute the global public key $Q_{TA} \leftarrow sP$.

Extract

To extract the private key for user U with $ID_U \in \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$.

- Compute the public key $Q_U \leftarrow H_0(ID_U)$ and the secret key $S_U \leftarrow sQ_U$.

Sign

For user A with identity ID_A to sign $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ with private key S_A corresponding to public key $Q_A \leftarrow H_0(ID_A)$.

- Choose r uniformly at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^* and compute $X \leftarrow rQ_A$.
- Compute $h_1 \leftarrow H_1(X||m)$ and $Z \leftarrow (r + h_1)S_A$.
- Return the signature (X, Z) and forward (m, r, X, Z) to **Encrypt**.

Encrypt

For user A with identity ID_A to encrypt m using r, X, Z output by **Sign** for receiver ID_B .

- Compute $Q_B \leftarrow H_0(ID_B)$ and $w \leftarrow \hat{e}(rS_A, Q_B)$.
- Compute $y \leftarrow H_2(w) \oplus (Z||ID_A||m)$ and return ciphertext (X, y) .

Decrypt

For user B with identity ID_B to decrypt (X, y) using $S_B = sH_0(ID_B)$.

- Compute $w \leftarrow \hat{e}(X, S_B)$ and $Z||ID_A||m \leftarrow y \oplus H_2(w)$.
- Forward message m , signature (X, Z) and purported sender ID_A to **Verify**.

Verify

To verify user A 's signature (X, Z) on message m where A has identity ID_A .

- Compute $Q_A \leftarrow H_0(ID_A)$ and $h_1 \leftarrow H_1(X||m)$.
- If $\hat{e}(Z, P) = \hat{e}(Q_{TA}, X + h_1Q_A)$, return \top . Else, return \perp .

Note that, as was the case in [7], the signing algorithm that our scheme uses is the scheme proposed in [8]. Also, the encryption is done in a manner similar to the BasicIdent scheme from [6]. The integrity checking necessary for security against adaptive adversaries comes from the signature in our case.

Section 5 below contains proofs that our scheme offers the same security properties as those offered by the scheme of [7]. In Table 1 and Table 2 below we compare the efficiency of our scheme, denoted IBSC, with that of [7], denoted MIBS. We only compare the computational effort for the schemes since the bandwidth requirements are identical. We use mls., exps. cps. and invs. as abbreviations for multiplications, exponentiations, computations and inversions respectively. The parameters n , k_0 and k_1 are those defined above. We use \mathbb{F}_q^* to denote the multiplicative group of the field of q elements.

Scheme	Sign/Encrypt			Decrypt/Verify		
	\mathbb{G}_1 mls.	\mathbb{G}_2 exps.	\hat{e} cps.	\mathbb{G}_1 mls.	\hat{e} cps.	\mathbb{F}_q^* invs.
MIBS	3	1	1	2	4	1
IBSC	3	0	1	1	3	0

Table 1. A comparison between the dominant operations required for IBSC and MIBS

We obtained timings for an instantiation of \mathbb{G}_1 , \mathbb{G}_2 and \hat{e} using the supersingular curve $E : y^2 = x^3 + x$ defined over \mathbb{F}_p where p is a 512-bit prime. This curve has $p + 1$ points and the value of p was chosen such that $p + 1$ has a 160-bit prime factor q . In this case the group \mathbb{G}_1 is the subgroup of order q in $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ and \mathbb{G}_2

is q -th roots of unity in $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}^*$. The implementation was done in C on a 667MHz G4 PowerPC. A point multiplication in \mathbb{G}_1 took 28.2 ms, an exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_2 took 5.1 ms, it took 32 ms to compute \hat{e} (the Tate pairing) and the cost of an inversion in F_q^* was negligible. These figures give us Table 2.

Scheme	Sign/Encrypt	Decrypt/Verify
MIBS	121.7 ms	184.4 ms
IBSC	116.6 ms	124.2 ms

Table 2. A comparison between timings of dominant operations in IBSC and MIBS

5 Security Results

In this section we will state the security results for the IBSC scheme under the definitions of Section 3. The corresponding proofs are given in the appendix.

All our security results are relative to the *bilinear Diffie-Hellman* (BDH) problem. Informally, using the notation of Section 4, this is the problem of computing $\hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$ from (P, aP, bP, cP) where a, b, c are chosen at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^* and P generates \mathbb{G}_1 . For further details see [6].

Our results are all in the random oracle model [5] i.e. we will assume that the hash functions H_0, H_1 and H_2 that the IBSC scheme uses are random oracles. In each of the results below we assume that the adversary makes q_i queries to H_i for $i = 0, 1, 2$. The number of sign/encrypt and decrypt/verify queries made by the adversary are denoted q_s and q_d respectively.

5.1 Ciphertext Authentication

Theorem 1. *If there is an AUTH-IBSC-CMA adversary \mathcal{A} of IBSC that succeeds with probability ϵ , then there is a simulator \mathcal{B} running in polynomial time that solves the BDH problem with probability at least*

$$\epsilon \cdot \left(1 - \frac{q_s(q_1 + q_2 + 2q_s)}{q}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{q_0(q_0 - 1)(q_s + q_d)(q_2 + q_s)}.$$

5.2 Message Confidentiality

Theorem 2. *If there is an IND-IBSC-CCA2 adversary \mathcal{A} of IBSC that succeeds with probability ϵ , then there is a simulator \mathcal{B} running in polynomial time that solves the BDH problem with probability at least*

$$\epsilon \cdot \left(1 - \frac{q_s(q_1 + q_s)}{q}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{q_0 q_2}.$$

5.3 Signature Non-Repudiation

Theorem 3. *If there is an EUF-IBSC-CMA adversary \mathcal{A} of IBSC that succeeds with probability ϵ , then there is a simulator \mathcal{B} running in polynomial time that solves the BDH problem with probability at least*

$$\epsilon \cdot \left(1 - \frac{q_s(q_1 + q_s)}{q}\right)^2 \cdot \frac{1}{4q_0^2(q_1 + q_s)^2}.$$

5.4 Ciphertext Anonymity

Theorem 4. *If there is an ANON-IBSC-CCA2 adversary \mathcal{A} of IBSC that succeeds with probability ϵ , then there is a simulator \mathcal{B} running in polynomial time that solves the BDH problem with probability at least*

$$\epsilon \cdot \left(1 - \frac{q_s(q_1 + q_2 + 2q_s)}{q}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{q_0(q_0 - 1)(2 + q_s)(q_2 + q_s)}.$$

6 Conclusions

We have proposed an identity-based signcryption scheme that is the most efficient to date. This scheme makes use of a simple encryption algorithm that alone is not secure against adaptive attack. We achieve security against adaptive adversaries using the integrity check offered by a signature scheme. We have also provided a complete security analysis for our scheme in the model of [7].

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Appendix

Proof of Theorem 1

We will show how an AUTH-IBSC-CMA adversary \mathcal{A} of IBSC may be used to construct a simulator \mathcal{B} that solves the BDH problem. Let (P, aP, bP, cP) be the instance of the BDH problem that we wish to solve.

We now describe the construction of the simulator \mathcal{B} . The simulator runs \mathcal{A} with trusted third party public key $Q_{TA} \leftarrow cP$. It also creates algorithms to respond to queries made by \mathcal{A} during its attack. To maintain consistency between queries made by \mathcal{A} , the simulator keeps the following lists: L_i for $i = 0, 1, 2$ of data for query/response pairs to random oracle H_i ; L_s of signcryptions generated by the simulator; and L_d of some of the queries made by \mathcal{A} to the decrypt/verify oracle. We will see in the construction of the sign/encrypt simulator that the list L_s stores other information that will be useful to \mathcal{B} . Its use will become apparent in the subsequent analysis as will the use of L_d .

Simulator: $H_0(ID_U)$

At the beginning of the simulation choose i_a, i_b uniformly at random from $\{1, \dots, q_0\}$ (subject to $i_a \neq i_b$). We show how to respond to the i -th query made by \mathcal{A} below. Note that we assume \mathcal{A} does not make repeat queries.

- If $i = i_a$ then respond with $H_0(ID_U) \leftarrow aP$ and set $ID_A \leftarrow ID_U$.
- If $i = i_b$ then respond with $H_0(ID_U) \leftarrow bP$ and set $ID_B \leftarrow ID_U$.
- Else choose x uniformly at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^* ; compute $Q_U \leftarrow xP$; compute $S_U \leftarrow xQ_{TA}$; store (ID_U, Q_U, S_U, x) in L_0 and respond with Q_U .

Simulator: $H_1(X||m)$

- If $(X||m, h_1) \in L_1$ for some h_1 , return h_1 .
- Else choose h_1 uniformly at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^* ; add $(X||m, h_1)$ to L_1 and return h_1 .

Simulator: $H_2(w)$

- If $(w, h_2) \in L_2$ for some h_2 , return h_2 .
- Else choose h_2 uniformly at random from $\{0, 1\}^{k_0+k_1+n}$; add (w, h_2) to L_2 and return h_2 .

Simulator: **Extract** (ID_U)

We will assume that \mathcal{A} makes the query $H_0(ID_U)$ before it makes the extraction query for ID_U .

- If $ID_U = ID_A$ or $ID_U = ID_B$, abort the simulation.
- Else search L_0 for the entry (ID_U, Q_U, S_U, x) corresponding to ID_U and return S_U .

Simulator: **Sign/Encrypt** (m, ID_1, ID_2)

We will assume that \mathcal{A} makes the queries $H_0(ID_1)$ and $H_0(ID_2)$ before it makes a sign/encrypt query using these identities. We have the following five cases to

consider.

Case 1: $ID_1 \neq ID_A$ and $ID_1 \neq ID_B$

- Find the entry (ID_1, Q_1, S_1, x) in L_0 .
- Choose r uniformly at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^* and compute $X \leftarrow rQ_1$.
- Compute $h_1 \leftarrow H_1(X||m)$ (where H_1 is the simulator above).
- Compute $Z \leftarrow (r + h_1)S_1$.
- Compute $Q_2 \leftarrow H_0(ID_2)$ (where H_0 is the simulator above).
- Compute $w \leftarrow \hat{e}(rS_1, Q_2)$.
- Compute $y \leftarrow H_2(w) \oplus (Z||ID_1||m)$ (where H_2 is the simulator above).
- Return (X, y) .

Case 2: $ID_1 = ID_A$, $ID_2 \neq ID_A$ and $ID_2 \neq ID_B$

- Choose r, h_1 uniformly at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^* .
- Compute $X \leftarrow rP - h_1Q_A$ and $Z \leftarrow rQ_{TA}$.
- Add $(X||m, h_1)$ to L_1 .
- Find the entry (ID_2, Q_2, S_2, x) in L_0 .
- Compute $w \leftarrow \hat{e}(X, S_2)$.
- Compute $y \leftarrow H_2(w) \oplus (Z||ID_A||m)$ (where H_2 is the simulator above).
- Return (X, y) .

Case 3: $ID_1 = ID_B$, $ID_2 \neq ID_A$ and $ID_2 \neq ID_B$

Use the simulation of Case 2 replacing (ID_A, Q_A) with (ID_B, Q_B)

Case 4: $ID_1 = ID_A$ and $ID_2 = ID_B$

- Follow the first four steps of Case 2.
- Choose $h_2 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_0+k_1+n}$ uniformly at random.
- Compute $y \leftarrow h_2 \oplus Z||ID_A||m$.
- Add $(ID_A, ID_B, X, y, Z, m, r, h_1, h_2)$ to L_s .
- Return (X, y) .

Case 5: $ID_1 = ID_B$ and $ID_2 = ID_A$

Use the simulation of Case 4 swapping (ID_A, Q_A, ID_B) with (ID_B, Q_B, ID_A) .

Decrypt/Verify: $(X, y), ID_2$

We assume that \mathcal{A} makes the query $H_0(ID_2)$ before making a decryption query for ID_2 . We have the following three cases to consider.

Case 1: $ID_2 \neq ID_A$ and $ID_2 \neq ID_B$

- Find the entry (ID_2, Q_2, S_2, x) in L_0 .
- Compute $w = \hat{e}(X, S_2)$.
- Initialize $b \leftarrow 1$.
- If $w \in L_2$, compute $Z||ID_1||m \leftarrow y \oplus H_2(w)$, else $b \leftarrow 0$.
- If $b = 1$ and $ID_1 \in L_0$, let $Q_1 \leftarrow H_0(ID_1)$, else $b \leftarrow 0$.
- If $b = 1$ and $X||m \in L_1$, let $h_1 \leftarrow H_1(X||m)$, else $b \leftarrow 0$.

- If $b = 1$ and $\hat{e}(Z, P) = \hat{e}(Q_{TA}, X + h_1Q_1)$, return m , (X, Z) and ID_1 , else step through the list L_s as follows.
 - If the current entry has the form $(ID_A, ID_B, X', y, Z, m', r, h'_1, h_2)$ then test if $\hat{e}(X', Q_B) = \hat{e}(X, xP)$. If so continue, else move on to the next element of L_s and begin again.
 - Else if the current entry has the form $(ID_B, ID_A, X', y, Z, m', r, h'_1, h_2)$ then test $\hat{e}(X', Q_A) = \hat{e}(X, xP)$. If so continue, else move on to the next element of L_s and begin again.
 - Compute $Z||ID_1||m \leftarrow y \oplus h_2$.
 - If $ID_1 = ID_2$ move to the next element in L_s and begin again.
 - If $ID_1 \in L_0$ let $Q_1 \leftarrow H_0(ID_1)$, else move to the next element in L_s .
 - If $X||m \in L_1$ let $h_1 \leftarrow H_1(X||m)$, else move to the next element in L_s .
 - Check that $\hat{e}(Z, P) = \hat{e}(Q_{TA}, X + h_1Q_1)$, if so return m , (X, Z) and ID_1 , if not move on to the next element in L_s and begin again.
- If no message has been returned, return \perp .

Case 2: $ID_2 = ID_B$

- If $(ID_A, ID_B, X, y, Z, m, r, h_1, h_2) \in L_s$ for some m , return m , (X, Z) , ID_A .
- Else, add $(X, y), ID_B$ to L_d and step through the list L_2 with entries (w, h_2) as follows.
 - Compute $Z||ID_1||m \leftarrow y \oplus h_2$.
 - If $ID_1 = ID_A$ or $ID_1 = ID_B$, move to the next element in L_2 and begin again.
 - If $ID_1 \in L_0$ let $Q_1 \leftarrow H_0(ID_1)$ and find S_1 in L_0 , else move to the next element in L_2 and begin again.
 - If $X||m \in L_1$ let $h_1 \leftarrow H_1(X||m)$, else move on to the next element in L_2 and begin again.
 - Check that $w = \hat{e}(Z - h_1S_1, Q_B)$ and if not move on to the next element in L_2 and begin again.
 - Check that $\hat{e}(Z, P) = \hat{e}(Q_{TA}, X + h_1Q_1)$, if so return m , (X, Z) and ID_1 , else move on to the next element in L_2 and begin again.
- If no message has been returned after stepping through the list L_2 , step through the list L_s as follows.
 - If the current entry has the form $(ID_A, ID_B, X', y, Z, m', r, h'_1, h_2)$ then check that $X' = X$. If so continue, else move on to the next element of L_s and begin again.
 - Else if the current entry has the form $(ID_B, ID_A, X', y, Z, m', r, h'_1, h_2)$ then check that $\hat{e}(X', Q_A) = \hat{e}(X, Q_B)$. If so continue, if not move on to the next element of L_s and begin again.
 - Compute $Z||ID_1||m \leftarrow y \oplus h_2$.
 - If $ID_1 = ID_B$, move to the next element in L_s and begin again.
 - If $ID_1 \in L_0$ let $Q_1 \leftarrow H_0(ID_1)$, else move to the next element in L_s .
 - If $X||m \in L_1$ let $h_1 \leftarrow H_1(X||m)$, else move to the next element in L_s .
 - Check that $\hat{e}(Z, P) = \hat{e}(Q_{TA}, X + h_1Q_1)$, if so return m , (X, Z) and ID_1 , else move on to the next element in L_s and begin again.
- If no message has been returned, return \perp .

Case 3: $ID_2 = ID_A$

Use the simulation of Case 2 replacing (ID_B, Q_B, ID_A) with (ID_A, Q_A, ID_B) .

Once \mathcal{A} has been run, \mathcal{B} does one of two things.

1. With probability $q_s/(q_s+q_d)$ choose a random element from L_s and a random element (w, h_2) from L_2 . We call this event Ch_1 in the analysis below (Ch for choice). The significance of the probability will become apparent in the subsequent analysis we only mention here that we are assuming $|L_s| = q_s$ at the end of our simulation. This is the worst case scenario.

- If the chosen element has form $(ID_A, ID_B, X, y, Z, m, r, h_1, h_2)$, compute

$$B = (w/\hat{e}(rbP, cP))^{-1/h_1}.$$

- If the chosen element has form $(ID_B, ID_A, X, y, Z, m, r, h_1, h_2)$, compute

$$B = (w/\hat{e}(raP, cP))^{-1/h_1}.$$

2. With probability $q_d/(q_s+q_d)$ choose a random element from L_d and a random element (w, h_2) from L_2 . We call this event Ch_2 in the analysis below. Again, the significance this probability will become apparent in the subsequent analysis. As above, we are assuming $|L_d| = q_d$ at the end of our simulation. This is the worst case scenario.

- If the chosen element from L_d has the form $(X, y), ID_B$ compute $y \oplus h_2$.

If $y \oplus h_2$ has the form $Z||ID_A||m$ for some Z, m , compute

$$B = (w/\hat{e}(Z, bP))^{-1/h_1}.$$

If $y \oplus h_2$ does not have this form \mathcal{B} has failed.

- If the chosen element from L_d has the form $(X, y), ID_A$ compute $y \oplus h_2$.

If $y \oplus h_2$ has the form $Z||ID_B||m$ for some Z, m , compute

$$B = (w/\hat{e}(Z, aP))^{-1/h_1}.$$

If $y \oplus h_2$ does not have this form \mathcal{B} has failed.

The rationale for these probabilities and computations will become apparent in the discussion of equations (1), (2), (4) and (5) below.

Let us now analyze our simulation. The simulations for the random oracles and the extraction queries are trivial. The simulation of the sign/encrypt queries uses standard techniques. We make some remarks about the simulation of the decrypt/verify queries since this is less obvious. We will treat each case separately.

Case 1: In this case the simulator \mathcal{B} knows the secret key of the receiver and so it is able to compute the correct ephemeral encryption key. The first six steps in this case are therefore those that would be followed in genuine decryption and verification. The reason that it does not stop at this point is that the sign/encrypt

simulator implicitly defines $H_2(w)$ for values of w that are unknown to the simulator. It must check that the ephemeral encryption key w that it has computed is not one of these values. For example, suppose that there is an entry of the form $(ID_A, ID_B, X', y, Z, m, r, h'_1, h_2)$ in L_s . Referring back to the construction of the sign/encrypt simulator, it needs to know if

$$\hat{e}(X', S_B) = \hat{e}(X, S_2).$$

The simulator knows that $S_2 = xQ_{TA} = xcP$ and it know $S_B = bQ_{TA} = bcP = cQ_B$ so this test becomes

$$\hat{e}(X', Q_B) = \hat{e}(X, xP).$$

Case 2: In this case the simulator \mathcal{B} does not know the secret key of the receiver and so it is unable to compute the ephemeral encryption key $\hat{e}(X, S_B)$. The first loop, through the list L_2 , determines whether or not the H_2 value of the ephemeral encryption key is in L_2 itself i.e. for each w in L_2 it wants to know if $w = \hat{e}(X, S_B)$. Since by construction $Q_{TA} = cP$ this test becomes $w = \hat{e}(cX, Q_B)$ and, under the assumption that the ciphertext is correctly formed, it becomes $\hat{e}(Z - h_1S_1, Q_B)$. Note that if the ciphertext is not correctly formed the simulator does not care whether or not the value of $H_2(w)$ is defined since it is correct to reject. The final test in this loop is just the standard test for verification.

The second loop, through L_s , determines whether or not the value of $H_2(w)$ that \mathcal{B} is looking for has been determined by the sign/encrypt simulator. If it is searching L_s for an entry of form $(ID_A, ID_B, X', y, Z, m, r, h'_1, h_2)$ then the receivers identities are the same in this entry and in the decrypt/verify query that we are trying to respond to. The check is then simply on the values of X and X' .

If \mathcal{B} is looking at an entry of L_s of the form $(ID_B, ID_A, X', y, Z, m, r, h'_1, h_2)$ then the receivers identities are not the same in this entry and in the decrypt/verify query that it is trying to respond to. The check that it wishes to perform is $\hat{e}(X', S_A) = \hat{e}(X, S_B)$. This is clearly equivalent to the check $\hat{e}(X', Q_A) = \hat{e}(X, Q_B)$.

Case 3: The analysis is identical to that of Case 2 with A and B reversed.

Let us now consider how our simulation could fail i.e. describe events that could cause \mathcal{A} 's view to differ when run by \mathcal{B} from its view in a real attack. We call such an event an error and denote it **ER**.

It is clear that the simulations for H_0 and H_1 are indistinguishable from real random oracles. Let us now consider the H_2 simulator. The important point here is that H_2 is not only defined at points where the H_2 simulator is called by \mathcal{A} or by the simulator itself. It is also defined at certain points implicitly by the sign/encrypt simulator. For example, suppose that the sign/encrypt simulator responds to a query m, ID_A, ID_B . In this case it adds an entry $(ID_A, ID_B, X, y, Z, m, r, h_1, h_2)$ to L_s . This implicitly defines $H_2(\hat{e}(X, S_B)) = h_2$ although it is not actually able to compute $\hat{e}(X, S_B)$. If the H_2 simulator is subsequently called

with $w = \hat{e}(X, S_B)$ it will not recognise it and so it will not return h_2 . We denote such events H-ER. However, if such an event occurs we have

$$w = \hat{e}(X, S_B) = \hat{e}(rP - h_1Q_A, S_B)$$

from which it is possible to compute

$$\hat{e}(P, P)^{abc} = \hat{e}(Q_A, S_B) = (w/\hat{e}(rQ_B, Q_{TA}))^{-1/h_1} = (w/\hat{e}(rbP, cP))^{-1/h_1}. \quad (1)$$

Similarly if the H_2 simulator is called with w that is implicitly defined by an entry $(ID_B, ID_A, X, y, Z, m, r, h_1, h_2) \in L_s$ we can compute.

$$\hat{e}(P, P)^{abc} = \hat{e}(Q_B, S_A) = (w/\hat{e}(rQ_A, Q_{TA}))^{-1/h_1} = (w/\hat{e}(raP, cP))^{-1/h_1}. \quad (2)$$

Let us now consider how the simulation for sign/encrypt could fail. We denote such an event S-ER. The most likely failure will be caused by the sign/encrypt simulator responding to a query of the form Case 4 or Case 5 (see simulator). Since we do not know how often each case will occur we will be conservative and assume that each query will be one of these, 4 say. The only possibilities for introducing an error here are defining $H_1(X||m)$ when it is already defined or defining $H_2(\hat{e}(X, S_B))/H_2(\hat{e}(X, S_A))$ when it is already defined. Since X takes its value uniformly at random in $\langle P \rangle$, the chance of one of these events occurring is at most $(q_1 + q_2 + 2q_s)/q$ for each query. The $2q_s$ comes from the fact that the signing simulator adds elements to L_1 and L_2 . Therefore, over the whole simulation, the chance of an error introduced in this way is at most

$$q_s(q_1 + q_2 + 2q_s)/q. \quad (3)$$

We now turn our attention to the decrypt/verify simulator. An error in this simulator is denoted D-ER. It is clear that this simulator never accepts an invalid encryption. What we have to worry about is the possibility that it rejects a valid one. This can only occur with non-negligible probability in Case 2 or Case 3. Suppose that we are trying to decrypt $(X, y), ID_B$ (i.e. Case 2). An error will only occur if while stepping through L_2 there is an entry (w, h_2) such that $Z||ID_A||m \leftarrow y \oplus h_2$ and (X, y) is a valid encryption of m from ID_A to ID_B . In this case we must have

$$w = \hat{e}(Z - h_1S_A, Q_B) = \hat{e}(Z, Q_B) \cdot \hat{e}(-h_1S_A, Q_B) = \hat{e}(Z, bP) \cdot \hat{e}(-h_1acP, bP),$$

where $h_1 = H_1(X||m)$. From the above we can compute

$$\hat{e}(P, P)^{abc} = (w/\hat{e}(Z, bP))^{-1/h_1}. \quad (4)$$

Suppose now that we are trying to decrypt $(X, y), ID_A$ (i.e. Case 3). An error will only occur if while stepping through L_2 there is an entry (w, h_2) such that $Z||ID_B||m \leftarrow y \oplus h_2$ and (X, y) is a valid encryption of m from ID_B to ID_A . In this case we must have

$$w = \hat{e}(Z - h_1S_B, Q_A) = \hat{e}(Z, Q_A) \cdot \hat{e}(-h_1S_B, Q_A) = \hat{e}(Z, aP) \cdot \hat{e}(-h_1bcP, aP),$$

from which we can compute

$$\hat{e}(P, P)^{abc} = (w/\hat{e}(Z, aP))^{-1/h_1}. \quad (5)$$

The final simulator is the extract simulator. Note that the adversary will only succeed in its task with non-negligible probability if it queries H_0 with the two identities under which the encrypted and signed message it produces is supposed to be valid. Looking at the H_0 simulator we see that it chooses two H_0 queries made by the adversary and responds to these with group elements from the BDH instance that it is trying to solve. The simulator hopes that these will be the identities for the adversary's encrypted and signed message. This will be the case with probability at least

$$1/q_0(q_0 - 1). \quad (6)$$

If this is not the case we say that an error has occurred in the extract simulator because, if the adversary tried to extract the private key for these identities, the simulator would abort. An error in the extract simulator is denoted **E-ER**.

Once \mathcal{A} has been run by the simulator \mathcal{B} , there are two courses of action: Ch_1 and Ch_2 (as described above). If Ch_1 has been chosen, we denote the event that \mathcal{B} selects the correct elements to solve the BDH problem from L_s and H_2 by CG_1 (under the assumption that there are such correct elements in the lists at the end of the simulation). Likewise if Ch_2 has been chosen, we denote the event that \mathcal{B} selects the correct elements from L_d and H_2 by CG_2 .

With the events described above we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}[\mathcal{B}] &\geq \Pr[\neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \text{H-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER} \wedge \text{Ch}_1 \wedge \text{CG}_1] \\ &\quad + \Pr[\text{D-ER} \wedge \neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \neg\text{H-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER} \wedge \text{Ch}_2 \wedge \text{CG}_2] \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

We have

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr[\neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \text{H-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER} \wedge \text{Ch}_1 \wedge \text{CG}_1] \\ &= \Pr[\neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER}] \cdot \Pr[\text{Ch}_1 \wedge \text{CG}_1] \cdot \Pr[\text{H-ER}] \quad (\text{by independence}). \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Also,

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr[\text{D-ER} \wedge \neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \neg\text{H-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER} \wedge \text{Ch}_2 \wedge \text{CG}_2] \\ &= \Pr[\text{D-ER}] \cdot \Pr[\neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \neg\text{H-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER}] \cdot \Pr[\text{Ch}_2 \wedge \text{CG}_2] \quad (\text{by independence}). \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

Note that, in the event $\neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \neg\text{H-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER}$, the adversary \mathcal{A} is run by \mathcal{B} in exactly the same way that it would be run in a real attack until the event **D-ER** occurs. Moreover, in the event $\neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \neg\text{H-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER}$, \mathcal{A} winning and **D-ER** are equivalent. This means that (9) becomes

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr[\text{D-ER} \wedge \neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \neg\text{H-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER} \wedge \text{Ch}_2 \wedge \text{CG}_2] \\ &= \epsilon \cdot \Pr[\neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER}] \cdot \Pr[\text{Ch}_2 \wedge \text{CG}_2] \cdot \Pr[\neg\text{H-ER}]. \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

From the definitions of Ch_1 , CG_1 , Ch_2 and CG_2 above it is clear that

$$\Pr[\text{Ch}_1 \wedge \text{CG}_1] = \frac{q_s}{q_s + q_d} \cdot \frac{1}{q_s(q_2 + q_s)} = \frac{1}{(q_s + q_d)(q_2 + q_s)} \text{ and} \quad (11)$$

$$\Pr[\text{Ch}_2 \wedge \text{CG}_2] = \frac{q_d}{q_s + q_d} \cdot \frac{1}{q_d(q_2 + q_s)} = \frac{1}{(q_s + q_d)(q_2 + q_s)}. \quad (12)$$

Note that we are assuming a worst case scenario here i.e. $|L_s| = q_s$ and $|L_d| = q_d$. We will make this assumption throughout the remaining analysis without further comment. From, the fact that $\Pr[\text{H-ER}] + \Pr[\neg\text{H-ER}] = 1$, (7), (8), (10), (11) and (12) we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}[\mathcal{B}] &\geq (\Pr[\text{H-ER}] + \epsilon \cdot \Pr[\neg\text{H-ER}]) \cdot \Pr[\neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER}] \cdot \frac{1}{(q_s + q_d)(q_2 + q_s)} \\ &\geq \epsilon \cdot (\Pr[\text{H-ER}] + \Pr[\neg\text{H-ER}]) \cdot \Pr[\neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER}] \cdot \frac{1}{(q_s + q_d)(q_2 + q_s)} \\ &= \epsilon \cdot \Pr[\neg\text{E-ER} \wedge \neg\text{S-ER}] \cdot \frac{1}{(q_s + q_d)(q_2 + q_s)}. \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

Finally, by the independence of E-ER and S-ER, using (3), (6) and (13) we have

$$\text{Adv}[\mathcal{B}] \geq \epsilon \cdot \left(1 - \frac{q_s(q_1 + q_2 + 2q_s)}{q}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{q_0(q_0 - 1)(q_s + q_d)(q_2 + q_s)} \quad (14)$$

as required.

Proof of Theorem 2

We will show how an IND-IBSC-CCA2 adversary \mathcal{A} of IBSC may be used to construct a simulator \mathcal{B} that solves the BDH problem. Let (P, aP, bP, cP) be the instance of the BDH problem that we wish to solve.

The simulator runs \mathcal{A} with $Q_{TA} \leftarrow bP$. It keeps lists as in the proof of Theorem 1. We describe how \mathcal{B} runs Phase 1 of \mathcal{A} 's attack below.

Simulator: $H_0(ID_U)$

At the beginning of the simulation choose i_β uniformly at random from $\{1, \dots, q_0\}$. We show how to respond to the i -th query made by \mathcal{A} below. Note that we assume \mathcal{A} does not make repeat queries.

- If $i = i_\beta$ then respond with $H_0(ID_U) \leftarrow aP$ and set $ID_\beta \leftarrow ID_U$.
- Else choose x uniformly at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^* ; compute $Q_U \leftarrow xP$; compute $S_U \leftarrow xQ_{TA}$; store (ID_U, Q_U, S_U, x) in L_0 and respond with Q_U .

Simulator: $H_1(X||m)$ and $H_2(w)$ as in the proof of Theorem 1.

Simulator: **Extract** (ID_U)

We will assume that \mathcal{A} makes the query $H_0(ID_U)$ before it makes the extraction query for ID_U .

- If $ID_U = ID_\beta$, abort the simulation.
- Else search L_0 for the entry (ID_U, Q_U, S_U, x) corresponding to ID_U and return S_U .

Simulator: Sign/Encrypt (m, ID_1, ID_2)

We will assume that \mathcal{A} makes the queries $H_0(ID_1)$ and $H_0(ID_2)$ before it makes a sign/encrypt query using these identities. We have two cases to consider.

Case 1: $ID_1 \neq ID_\beta$

Use the simulator from Case 1 of sign/encrypt in the proof of Theorem 1.

Case 2: $ID_1 = ID_\beta$

Use the simulator from Case 2 of sign/encrypt in the proof of Theorem 1 replacing ID_A with ID_β and replacing Q_A with aP .

Decrypt/Verify $(X, y), ID_2$

We assume that \mathcal{A} makes the query $H_0(ID_2)$ before making a decryption query for ID_2 . We have the following three cases to consider.

Case 1: $ID_2 \neq ID_\beta$

- Find the entry (ID_2, Q_2, S_2, x) in L_0 .
- Compute $w = \hat{e}(X, S_2)$.
- If $w \notin L_2$, return \perp . Else $Z||ID_1||m \leftarrow y \oplus H_2(w)$.
- If $ID_1 = ID_2$ or $ID_1 \notin L_0$, return \perp . Else $Q_1 \leftarrow H_0(ID_1)$.
- If $X||m \in L_1$, return \perp . Else $h_1 \leftarrow H_1(X||m)$.
- If $\hat{e}(Z, P) \neq \hat{e}(Q_{TA}, X + h_1Q_1)$, return \perp . Else return $m, (X, Z), ID_1$.

Case 2: $ID_2 = ID_\beta$

- Step through the list L_2 with entries (w, h_2) as follows.
 - Compute $Z||ID_1||m \leftarrow y \oplus h_2$.
 - If $ID_1 = ID_\beta$, move to the next element in L_2 and begin again.
 - If $ID_1 \in L_0$ let $Q_1 \leftarrow H_0(ID_1)$ and find S_1 in L_0 , else move to the next element in L_2 and begin again.
 - If $X||m \in L_1$ let $h_1 \leftarrow H_1(X||m)$, else move to the next element in L_2 .
 - Check that $w = \hat{e}(Z - h_1S_1, aP)$ and if not move on to the next element in L_2 and begin again.
 - Check that $\hat{e}(Z, P) = \hat{e}(Q_{TA}, X + h_1Q_1)$, if so return $m, (X, Z)$ and ID_1 , else move on to the next element in L_2 .
- If no message has been returned after stepping through L_2 , return \perp .

At the end of Phase 1 the adversary outputs two identities $\{ID_A, ID_B\}$ and two messages $\{m_0, m_1\}$. If $ID_B \neq ID_\beta$, \mathcal{B} aborts the simulation. Otherwise it chooses $y^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_0+k_1+n}$ and sets $X^* \leftarrow cP$. It returns the challenge ciphertext $\sigma^* \leftarrow (X^*, y^*)$ to \mathcal{A} . The queries made by \mathcal{A} in Phase 2 are responded to in the same way as those made by \mathcal{A} in Phase 1.

At the end of Phase 2, \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b . The simulator ignores this bit. It searches L_0 for the entry (ID_A, Q_A, S_A, x_a) , it chooses some w at random from L_2 and returns

$$w^{x_a^{-1}} \tag{15}$$

as its guess at the solution to the BDH problem for (P, aP, bP, cP) .

Let us now consider how our simulation could fail when it executes Phase 1 of \mathcal{A} 's attack i.e. what events could cause \mathcal{A} 's view to differ when run by \mathcal{B} from its view in a real attack. We call such an event an error and denote it ER.

It is clear that the simulations for H_0 and H_1 are indistinguishable from genuine random oracles. Also, unlike the proof of Theorem 1, the simulation of H_2 is always sound since now it is only defined at points where the H_2 simulator is called by \mathcal{A} or by the simulator \mathcal{B} .

Let us now consider how the simulation for sign/encrypt could fail. The only possibility for introducing an error here is defining $H_1(X||m)$ when it is already defined. Since X takes its value uniformly at random in $\langle P \rangle$, the chance of one of these events occurring is at most $(q_1 + q_s)/q$ for each query. The q_s comes from the fact that the signing simulator adds elements to L_1 . Therefore, over the whole simulation, the chance of an error introduced in this way is at most

$$q_s(q_1 + q_s)/q. \tag{16}$$

It is easy to see that the possibility for error in the decrypt/verify simulator for Theorem 1 are removed in our simulation here. The final simulator to consider is the extract simulator.

The final simulator is the extract simulator. Looking at the H_0 simulator we see that it chooses one H_0 query made by the adversary and responds to this with group elements from the BDH instance that it is trying to solve. The simulator hopes that this will be the identity chosen by \mathcal{A} for the recipient in the challenge. This will be the case with probability at least

$$1/q_0. \tag{17}$$

If this is not the case we say that an error has occurred in the extract simulator because, if the adversary tried to extract the private key for this identity, the simulator would abort.

Let us now consider what errors there could be when \mathcal{B} executes Phase 2 of \mathcal{A} . All the same errors are possible, in addition the simulator will fail if the adversary makes the H_2 query $w = \hat{e}(P, P)^{x_a abc}$. However, if \mathcal{A} has any advantage it must make this query, and once it has done so we have trapped it into leaving enough information in L_2 to solve the BDH problem with probability $1/q_2$.

From the above remark combined with (16) and (17) we conclude that \mathcal{B} succeeds with probability at least

$$\epsilon \cdot \left(1 - \frac{q_s(q_1 + q_s)}{q}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{q_0 q_2}. \tag{18}$$

Proof of Theorem 3

We are going to use the "forking lemma" technique of Pointcheval and Stern [20] to prove our result. We will in fact reduce the standard Diffie-Hellman problem

to the problem of forging. Since a black box for the Diffie-Hellman problem is sufficient to solve the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem the result will follow. We will now show how an EUF-IBSC-CMA adversary \mathcal{A} of IBSC may be used to construct a simulator \mathcal{B} that solves the Diffie-Hellman problem. Let (P, aP, bP) be the instance of the Diffie-Hellman problem that we wish to solve. The simulator \mathcal{B} runs in three stages: $\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2$ and \mathcal{B}_3 .

The simulator \mathcal{B}_1 runs \mathcal{A} with trusted third party public key $Q_{TA} \leftarrow bP$. It also creates algorithms to respond to queries made by \mathcal{A} during its attack. To maintain consistency between queries made by \mathcal{A} , the simulator keeps lists as in the proof of Theorem 1.

Simulator: $H_0(ID_U)$

At the beginning of the simulation choose i_a uniformly at random from $\{1, \dots, q_0\}$. We show how to respond to the i -th query made by \mathcal{A} below. Note that we assume \mathcal{A} does not make repeat queries.

- If $i = i_a$ then respond with $H_0(ID_U) \leftarrow aP$ and set $ID_A \leftarrow ID_U$.
- Else choose x uniformly at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^* ; compute $Q_U \leftarrow xP$; compute $S_U \leftarrow xQ_{TA}$; store (ID_U, Q_U, S_U, x) in L_0 and respond with Q_U .

Simulator: $H_1(X||m)$ and $H_2(w)$ as in the proof of Theorem 1.

Simulator: Extract (ID_U)

We will assume that \mathcal{A} makes the query $H_0(ID_U)$ before it makes the extraction query for ID_U .

- If $ID_U = ID_A$, abort the simulation.
- Else search L_0 for the entry (ID_U, Q_U, S_U, x) corresponding to ID_U and return S_U .

Simulator: Sign/Encrypt (m, ID_1, ID_2)

We will assume that \mathcal{A} makes the queries $H_0(ID_1)$ and $H_0(ID_2)$ before it makes a sign/encrypt query using these identities. We have the following two cases.

Case 1: $ID_1 \neq ID_A$

Use the simulator from Case 1 of sign/encrypt in the proof of Theorem 1.

Case 2: $ID_1 = ID_A$

Use the simulator from Case 2 of sign/encrypt in the proof of Theorem 1.

Simulator: Decrypt/Verify $(X, y), ID_2$

We assume that \mathcal{A} makes the query $H_0(ID_2)$ before making a decryption query for ID_2 . We have the following three cases to consider.

Case 1: $ID_2 \neq ID_A$

Use the simulator from Case 1 of decrypt/verify in the proof of Theorem 2.

Case 2: $ID_2 = ID_A$

Use the simulator from Case 2 of decrypt/verify in the proof of Theorem 2 replacing ID_β with ID_A and replacing aP with Q_A .

Let us now consider how our simulation could fail i.e. what events could cause \mathcal{A} 's view to differ when run by \mathcal{B}_1 from its view in a real attack. We call such an event an error and denote it ER.

Clearly the simulations for H_0 and H_1 are indistinguishable from real random oracles. Also, unlike the proof of Theorem 1, the simulation of H_2 is always sound since now it is only defined at points where the H_2 simulator is called by \mathcal{A} or by the simulator.

Let us now consider how the simulation for sign/encrypt could fail. The analysis of this case is identical to the equivalent case in Theorem 2. An error is therefore introduced with probability at most

$$q_s(q_1 + q_s)/q. \quad (19)$$

It is easy to see that the possibility for error in the decrypt/verify simulator for Theorem 1 are removed in our simulation here. The final simulator to consider is the extract simulator.

The final simulator is the extract simulator. Note that the adversary will only succeed in its task with non-negligible probability if it queries H_0 with the identity under which the message contained in the ciphertext it returns is signed. Looking at the H_0 simulator we see that it chooses one H_0 query made by the adversary and responds to this with group elements from the BDH instance that it is trying to solve. The simulator hopes that this will be the signer identity for the ciphertext that it returns. This will be the case with probability at least

$$1/q_0. \quad (20)$$

If this is not the case we say that an error has occurred in the extract simulator because, if the adversary tried to extract the private key for this identity, the simulator would abort.

Now, from (19) and (20), it is clear that with probability greater or equal to

$$\epsilon \cdot \left(1 - \frac{q_s(q_1 + q_s)}{q}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{q_0}, \quad (21)$$

the simulator obtains from the adversary a recipient identity ID_B and a ciphertext c such that, if (m, ID_A, σ) is the result of decrypting c under the secret key corresponding to ID_B , $\mathbf{Verify}(m, ID_A, \sigma) = \top$. Note that, since we are assuming that \mathcal{A} has been successful, $ID_B \neq ID_A$ and so we can use the decryption process of the simulator. Also, if $\sigma = (X, Z)$ then, except with negligible probability, the H_1 query $X||m$ must have been made at some point during the simulation. We call this query the critical query.

Let Φ, Ψ be the random tapes for random oracle H_1 and simulator \mathcal{B}_1 respectively. That is to say Ψ is the random tape for all functions of \mathcal{B}_1 except random oracle H_1 . The random oracle H_1 is called $1/(q_1 + q_s)$ times. The second step in

the process of solving the Diffie-Hellman problem is to choose $j \leftarrow \{1, \dots, q_1 + q_s\}$ at random. We now split Φ into Φ_1 and Φ_2 where Φ_1 contains the random responses for queries $1, \dots, j-1$ and Φ_2 contains the random responses for queries $j, \dots, q_1 + q_s$. The next step of the simulation, \mathcal{B}_2 , is to run a simulation similar to \mathcal{B}_1 with the same Ψ and Φ_1 but a new Φ_2 , say Φ_2' . With probability

$$1/(q_1 + q_s) \quad (22)$$

the value of j that we chose corresponds to the critical query.

Our proof now uses the following lemma from [20].

Lemma 1 (The Splitting Lemma). *Let $E \subset \Theta \times \Upsilon$ be such that $\Pr[E] \geq \nu$. Define*

$$F = \{(\theta, v) \in \Theta \times \Upsilon : \Pr_{v' \in \Upsilon}[(\theta, v') \in E] \geq \nu/2\}.$$

We have the following

1. $\forall(\theta, v) \in F, \Pr_{v' \in \Upsilon}[(\theta, v') \in E] \geq \nu/2$.
2. $\Pr[F|E] \geq 1/2$.

Now, from (21), (22) and Lemma 1 applied with $\Theta = \Psi \cup \Phi_1$ and $\Upsilon = \Psi_2$, with probability greater or equal to

$$\epsilon^2 \cdot \left(1 - \frac{q_s(q_1 + q_s)}{q}\right)^2 \cdot \frac{1}{4q_0^2(q_1 + q_s)^2} \quad (23)$$

the two simulated runs of \mathcal{A} give us two signatures (X, Z) and (X, Z') on m with the following properties. After the first run of the simulation there is an $h_1^* \in L_1$ and after the second run there is an $h_1^{**} \in L_1$ (the responses to the critical queries) such that

$$Z = (r + h_1^*)abP \text{ and } Z' = (r + h_1^{**})abP \quad (24)$$

where $X = raP$. Assuming that \mathcal{B}_1 and \mathcal{B}_2 are successful, it is easy to see from (24) that the third stage of the simulation, \mathcal{B}_3 , can compute

$$abP = (h_1^* - h_1^{**})^{-1}(Z - Z'). \quad (25)$$

The result follows from (23) and (25).

Proof of Theorem 4

We assume that we have an instance (P, aP, bP, cP) of the BDH problem that we wish to solve. We will show how an ANON-IBSC-CCA2 adversary \mathcal{A} may be used to do this. Up until the end of Phase 1 of \mathcal{A} 's attack, \mathcal{B} runs \mathcal{A} in exactly the same way as the latter was run by the simulator in Theorem 1. Here we will change notation and refer to ID_A as ID_{β_0} and ID_B as ID_{β_1} .

At the end of Phase 1 the adversary \mathcal{A} outputs a message m ; two sender identities $\{ID_{A_0}, ID_{A_1}\}$; and two recipient identities $\{ID_{B_0}, ID_{B_1}\}$. If $\{ID_{B_0}, ID_{B_1}\} \neq \{ID_{\beta_0}, ID_{\beta_1}\}$ the simulator \mathcal{B} aborts. Note that we are assuming that H_0 has

already been queried at ID_{B_0} and ID_{B_1} by \mathcal{A} . If this is not the case we can define H_0 at these points as we wish i.e. as aP or bP .

The challenge is generated by choosing v at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^* and choosing y at random from $\{0, 1\}^{k_0+k_1+n}$. The challenge ciphertext returned to the adversary is (vaP, y) . The simulator \mathcal{B} stores v for use later in the simulation.

Once \mathcal{A} has finished its simulated execution \mathcal{B} does one of three things.

1. With probability $q_s/(2+q_s)$ choose a random element from L_s and a random element (w, h_2) from L_2 . We call this event Ch_1 in the analysis below.

– If the chosen element has form $(ID_{\beta_0}, ID_{\beta_1}, X, y, m, r, h_1, h_2)$, compute

$$B = (w/\hat{e}(rbP, cP))^{-1/h_1}.$$

– If the chosen element has form $(ID_{\beta_1}, ID_{\beta_0}, X, y, m, r, h_1, h_2)$, compute

$$B = (w/\hat{e}(raP, cP))^{-1/h_1}.$$

2. With probability $q_s/(2+q_s)$ choose a random element from L_d and a random element (w, h_2) from L_2 . We call this event Ch_2 in the analysis below.

– If the chosen element from L_d has the form $(X, y), ID_{\beta_1}$ compute $y \oplus h_2$.

If $y \oplus h_2$ has the form $Z||ID_{\beta_0}||m$ for some Z, m , compute

$$B = (w/\hat{e}(Z, bP))^{-1/h_1}.$$

If $y \oplus h_2$ does not have this form \mathcal{B} has failed.

– If the chosen element from L_d has the form $(X, y), ID_A$ compute $y \oplus h_2$.

If $y \oplus h_2$ has the form $Z||ID_{\beta_1}||m$ for some Z, m , compute

$$B = (w/\hat{e}(Z, aP))^{-1/h_1}.$$

If $y \oplus h_2$ does not have this form \mathcal{B} has failed.

3. With probability $2/(2+q_s)$ choose a random element (w, h_2) from L_2 and compute

$$B = w^{1/v}.$$

We call this event Ch_3 in the analysis below.

We define the events D-ER, E-ER, H-ER and S-ER as in the proof of Theorem 1. We will assume that the events E-ER and S-ER do not occur by removing a factor

$$\left(1 - \frac{q_s(q_1 + q_2 + 2q_s)}{q}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{q_0(q_0 - 1)} = \delta \quad (26)$$

from our success probability as in the proof of Theorem 1.

We define the event $\text{ER} = \text{S-ER} \wedge \text{D-ER}$. In the events Ch_1 , Ch_2 and Ch_3 we denote the event that \mathcal{B} selects the correct elements (assuming they exist) to solve the BDH problem by CG_1 , Ch_2 and CG_3 respectively. Note that, in the event $\neg\text{ER}$, \mathcal{A} can have no advantage until it makes one of the queries $\hat{e}(vaP, bcP)$ or $\hat{e}(vaP, acP)$ to H_2 , since the identities are perfectly masked until this point.

Only the former is useful to \mathcal{B} but \mathcal{A} will make them with equal probability. Using these definitions and observations, and assuming $q_d = q_s$, we can infer

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Adv}[\mathcal{B}] \geq & \delta \left(\mathbf{Pr}[\text{Ch}_1 \wedge \text{CG}_1 | \text{S-ER}] \cdot \mathbf{Pr}[\text{S-ER}] + \mathbf{Pr}[\text{Ch}_2 \wedge \text{CG}_2 | \text{D-ER}] \cdot \mathbf{Pr}[\text{D-ER}] \right. \\ & \left. + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \mathbf{Pr}[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins} | \neg \text{ER}] \cdot \mathbf{Pr}[\text{Ch}_3 \wedge \text{CG}_3] \cdot \mathbf{Pr}[\neg \text{ER}] \right). \end{aligned} \quad (27)$$

Examining the size of the relevant lists we see that

$$\mathbf{Pr}[\text{Ch}_1 \wedge \text{CG}_1] = \mathbf{Pr}[\text{Ch}_2 \wedge \text{CG}_2] = \frac{1}{(2 + q_s)(q_s + q_2)} \quad (28)$$

$$\mathbf{Pr}[\text{Ch}_3 \wedge \text{CG}_3] = \frac{2}{(2 + q_s)(q_s + q_2)} \quad (29)$$

Also, by definition we have $\mathbf{Pr}[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins} | \neg \text{ER}] = \epsilon$. Using this observation with (28), (29) and independence of events, (27) becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Adv}[\mathcal{B}] \geq & \\ \delta \left(\frac{1}{(2 + q_s)(q_s + q_2)} \cdot (\mathbf{Pr}[\text{S-ER}] + \mathbf{Pr}[\text{D-ER}]) + \frac{\epsilon}{(2 + q_s)(q_s + q_2)} \cdot \mathbf{Pr}[\neg \text{ER}] \right). & \end{aligned} \quad (30)$$

By independence we have $\mathbf{Pr}[\text{S-ER}] + \mathbf{Pr}[\text{D-ER}] = \mathbf{Pr}[\text{S-ER} \vee \text{D-ER}] = \mathbf{Pr}[\text{ER}]$ and also $\mathbf{Pr}[\text{ER}] + \mathbf{Pr}[\neg \text{ER}] = 1$. Using this and (30) we obtain

$$\mathbf{Adv}[\mathcal{B}] \geq \epsilon \cdot \delta \cdot \frac{1}{(2 + q_s)(q_s + q_2)}. \quad (31)$$

The result follows from (26) and (31).